

THE
THEORY and REGULATION
OF
LOVE.

A Moral Essay.

IN TWO PARTS.

To which are added Letters Philosophical and Moral between the Author and Dr *Henry More*.

By John Norris M. A. and Fellow of
Allsouls College in Oxford.

*Quod ergo nos Cælo restituit,
Non Dei Cognitio est, sed Amor.*

Marfilius Ficinus Tom. 2. p. 296.

OXFORD,
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1688.

T O T H E
LADY MASHAM
A T
O A T E S in E S S E X.

Madam,

THE Esteem, wherewith your
Ladyship honour'd my former
writings, has at once *obliged*
me to an high measure of *Grati-
tude*, and *pointed* me out a way
of *shewing* it. For I was hence
led to conclude, that if any thing
of Mine could afford you Plea-
sure and Entertainment, when you
had no other interest in it than in
the

THE EPISTLE

the *Common* light of the Sun, much more would it be acceptable, if made yours by some *peculiar* Right and Property. The difference of advantage seeming to me much the same, as between taking a turn in a *Common walk*, and enjoying the Retirements of one's *own Private Garden*.

One only Objection stood in my way. I was a little scrupulous whether the *Oblation* were worthy the *Altar*, whether so mean a Performance could *Strike* the *Tast*, much more *deserve* the *Patronage* of a Person of such nice and refined Sense, and whom *Nature* and your own *unassisted Curiosity* have Conspired to accomplish beyond what the *Present Age* can

DEDICATORY.

can *parallel*, Or (unless your Ladyship will be perswaded to bequeath some Monument of your extraordinary Genius to the world) the *Future* will ever *believe*. This Consideration I confess, did a little *arrest* my Pen, till I confronted it with another, that your Ladyship is as Eminent for Candour and goodness, as for Parts and Ingenious Attainments, and that you have Mildness and Sweetness enough to temper the *Severity* even of your *own Judgment*.

These Madam, were the Considerations that embolden'd me to entitle your Ladyship to this work. Concerning which (whatever faults it may be charged with) I have something to boast, which

THE EPISTLE, &c.

which I am sure all writers have not, that I make an Offering of that which is purely my *Own*. Which if your Ladyship please to accept, there will be much added both to the *Happiness* and to the *Duty* of

Madam,

*Your Ladyship's most humble
and devoted Servant*

J. Norris.

All-souls Coll.
March 26. 1688.

T O T H E R E A D E R.

HAVING accounted in the first Section for the general Design of this undertaking, I have here no more to do than only to prepare the Reader, by giving him some few Advertisements concerning the Manner of its Performance.

In the first place, I make no Apologies; For I would not have exposed these Papers to the view of the world if I thought they needed any. Neither do I desire any Favour or kind allowances from my Reader, I only desire that he would be so kind to himself, and so just to me, as to afford me his Closest and most unprejudiced Attention, that he would suspend his Judgment till he has gone over the whole, and that then he would Censure no farther than he Understands.

This

To the Reader.

This Request is at all times Reasonable, but now I think it in a manner necessary. For I have here used great Liberty of Thinking, and accordingly could not avoid lighting upon several Notions, which are remote from common Observation, and some that are directly contrary to the Vulgar Sentiments. And these I have endeavour'd to dispose according to the greatest Accuracy of Order and Method, and to carry on with a Thred of more than ordinary connexion and Dependence. All which, as it requires a great deal of Attention and Application of mind in the Composer, so does it almost as much in the Reader, who can no more expect with an hasty and careless glance to comprehend the Recesses and Retirements of a nice Speculation, than a man that rides Post can discern the artful strokes and curiosities of a fine-wrought Picture.

*Attention therefore is the thing that I do again commend to him that shall
find*

To the Reader.

find leasure to persue these Meditations ; Though for his comfort I must tell him, that I have endeavour'd to ease him of this trouble as much as I could , by expressing my Notions with all possible distinctness and Perspicuity. In order to which I found it necessary sometimes to use new Terms , and such as would raise more clear and distinct Ideas than those which had before obtain'd , which I hope will easily be excused by those who consider , that Words are purely in Order to Thoughts, and would therefore rather think rightly, than Speak Customarily.

*And this I was the more necessitated to do, by reason of the Novelty and Singularity of my Design. For I must further observe to the Reader, that this way of writing Ethics is intirely New and unblown upon. For though the reduction of all Vertue and Vice to the various Modification of Love be Obvious enough to any one that will consider, yet I do not know of any Moralist that ever drew
up*

To the Reader.

up a Scheme of Morality upon this Hypothesis.

I hope the Reader will find it here done to his satisfaction, though I must tell him that I do not descend to a particular consideration of Virtues and Vices, it being not my Design to insist minutely upon Particulars, but only to lay down such general Principles upon which a more Particular Scheme of Morality may be erected, or into which those Particular Morals which are already extant may and ought to be ultimately resolv'd.

The whole I have endeavour'd to comprize within as little Room as may be. I have set my self this Law, to write nothing but what is directly and Perpendicularly to the Point in hand, and to express what is so in as few words as I could with perspicuity. For I think it the Perfection of Discourse to come as nigh Intuition as may be, and that none are so far removed from the Measures of Angels, as prolix and voluminous

To the Reader.

luminous writers. It would have been more for my own ease to have been lax and Popular, but I thought it of more concern to consult the Patience, the Time, and the Purse of the Reader.

Joh. Norris.

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THE

P A R T. I.

S E C T. I.

The general designe of this undertaking, and its great usefullness to the whole drift of Morality.

I **T**HE Subject of these Contemplations is *Love*. A thing that has employ'd many curious pens to little purpose, and has been perhaps the *most* and with all the *worst* written upon of any Subject in the world. 'Tis I confess, strange that men should *write* so darkly and Confusedly of that which they *feel* and experiment so intimately, but I must take the boldness to say that what I have hitherto seen upon this Subject,
A has

has been so Confused, ambiguous and indistinct, that I was thereby rather *distracted*, than *inform'd* in my Notions concerning it.

2 Finding therefore no Satisfaction in advising with *Books*, I was fain to shut my Eyes and let myself a *Thinking*, without having any regard to what others had observ'd upon the same matter, so as to be in the least sway'd or determin'd in my Conclusions by it. A method that would tend more to the discovery of *Truth*, and to the Advancement of all *Notional Learning*, than that narrow straitlaced humour of adhering to the Dictates of those, who have nothing more to recommend them, but only the *luck* of being *born* before us.

3 My design therefore here is to employ my Meditations about two things, 1st. the *Theory* of Love according to its full Latitude and Comprehension, and 2^{ly}. the *Measures* of its *Regulation*. The discharge of which double undertaking

taking will thoroughly exhaust the Subject, and answer the Ends both of *Speculation* and *Practise*.

4 I think it requisite to begin with the *Theory* of Love. For since the *Physitian* thinks it necessary to know the *Anatomy* of that Body which he is to *Cure*, and the *Logician* to open the nature of those Intellectual operations which he is to *direct*, I know not why the *Moralist* should not think himself equally concern'd to frame a just *Theory* of that Affection of the Soul which he is to *regulate*.

5 The whole work I conceive to be of great usefulness and general importance to all the purposes of Morality, nay indeed to contain the whole Sum and Substance of it. For what is the grand intendment and final upshot of Morality but to teach a man to *Love regularly*? As a man *Loves* so is he. Love is not only the *Fulfilling*, but also the *Transgressing* of the Law, and Virtue and Vice is nothing else but the

Various Application and Modification of *Love*. By this a Good man is distinguish'd from a bad, and an Angel of Light from an Angel of Darkness. This is that which discriminates the Orders of men here, and will consign us to different Portions hereafter, according to that of *St. Austin* *Faciunt Civitates duas Amores duo. Hierusalem facit Amor Dei: Babylonem Amor Sæculi. Interroget ergo se quisque quid Amet, & inveniet unde sit Civis. The two Loves make the two Cittys. The Love of God makes Hierusalem, the Love of the World Babylon. Let every one therefore ask himself what 'tis he Loves, and he will find to which Citty he belongs.*

De. Civ. Dei l. 14.

Cap. 28. Tom. 5.

6 He therefore that shall rightly state the Nature, and prescribe due Measures for the Regulation of Love, not only serves the Cause of Morality, but may be truely sayd to discharge the whole Province of a Moralist; This I take to be a Sufficient Apology
for

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for the *undertaking* it self, and if the *Performance* come up to the Moment of the Design (whereof the world is to judge) I know of nothing wanting to render it both *Serviceable* and *acceptable* to the Public.

A 3

SECT.

S E C T. II.

*Of the dignity and Nature of Love in general,
and of the first and great Division of it.*

I **L**ET us make Man in our Image,
after our own likeness, sayd God.
Now among other instances of Resem-
blance wherein man may be likened
to God, such as the Internal Rectitude
of his Nature, or *Self-dominion*, and
his *External* dominion over the Crea-
tures and the like, this I think may be
Consider'd as one, and perhaps as the
Chieftest of all, that as in the Divine
nature there are two Processions, one
by way of *Intellect* which is the λόγος or
word, and the other by way of *Love*
which is the *H. Spirit*, so likewise in
the Humane nature there are as it were
two *Processions*, and that of the same
kind too as in the Divine, *Understanding*
and *Love*.

2 These

2 These are the two Noble Facultys that branche out from the Soul of man, and whereby he becomes a little *Image* of the *Trinity*. And altho' we generally value our Selves most upon the *Former*, yet I know not whether there be not an Equality in *these* as there is in the *Divine* Proceffions, and whether it be not as much the Glory of man to be an *Amorous*, as to be a *Rational* Being.

3 Sure I am that in the Gentile Theology and in the most refined Philosophy of the Ancients the preheminence is given to *Love*. *Socrates* in *Plato's Symposium* says Concerning Love, that it is *πρῶτον καὶ τιμωτάτον Θεῶν* the *eldest and most honorable of the Gods*. And we know Love is made the first Hypostasis in the Platonic Triad. The Holy Scripture goes yet higher, and does not only in several places set forth Love as the *Flower* of the Divinity, and magnify the Divine Essence chiefly from that Excellence, but seems to resolve
all

all the Perfection of the Deity into this *one Point*. For when it defines God it does not say he is *Wisdom* or *Power*, no not so much as *Wise* or *Powerfull*, but seems to overlook all his other Perfections, and says in the Abstract that he is *Love*. They are great words of *St. John*, and such as make ^{I. 4. 16.} much for the great Dignity of this Divine Affection, *God is Love, and he that dwelleth in Love dwelleth in God*. So Noble a thing is Love, and so deserving of our most intense Theory and Inspection.

5 And indeed it *needs* it, as well as *deserves* it. For there is nothing that darken's the Nature of things, and obscures the Clarity of our Conceptions more than Ambiguity of Terms, and I know nothing that is more Equivocal and full of Latitude than this word, *Love*. It is given to things whose Ideas are Notoriously different, and men seem to have agreed together not to detect the Fallacy, and from the Identity

tity of the *name* to conclude the Identity of the *thing*. To give one instance out of many, what is there that passes for an Axiom of a more simple, certain and uniform Signification than that Common Proposition in Divinity, that *we must love God for himself, and our Neighbor for God's sake*. But now when we come to examin what Ideas we have under these words, 'tis plain that that Idea which is express'd by Love in the first part of the Proposition, is not the same with that which is express'd by Love in the Second. For Love in reference to God Signifys *Simple Desire*, and in reference to our Neighbor, *wishing well to*, which Ideas are as different as East and West, and yet because of the Commonnes of the Name, and the Jingling turn of the Proposition, this passes smoothly and unquestionably for one and the same Love.

5 But tho' this word Love be used to signify Ideas so very different that
they

they seem to have nothing in Common but the Name, yet I think there is one thing wherein they all agree and whereof they all partake, and which may therefore be acknowledg'd as the *General and Transcendental* Notion of Love. And that is, *A motion of the Soul towards good*. This I say is the first and most general Notion of Love, and which runs throughout all the Species of it. But then this includes two things. For as in the motion of Bodys we first Conceive *Gravity* or a Connaturality to a certain Term of motion, and then the motion it self which is consequent upon it, so also in Love (which is the motion of the Soul) order requires that we first conceive a certain Connaturality or Coaptation of the Soul to good, whence arises all the variety of its *actual* motions and tendencys toward it. This I take to be that peculiar Habitude of the Soul to good which the Schools call *Complacentia boni* a *Complacence*, a *Liking*

[II]

Liking or *Relish* of good, which I consider as really distinct from and antecedent to its actual motion towards it. For as 'tis observ'd by *Aristotle* with more than Ordinary Nicenes in his 3^d *de Anima*; The motion of Love is in a *Circle*. First good moves and acts upon the Soul, and then the Soul moves and exerts it self towards good, that so *there* may be the *End* whence was the *Rise* of its motion. This first Alteration of the Soul from good answers to *Gravity* in *Bodys*, and may be call'd for distinction sake the *Moral Gravity of the Soul*, the Second to *Gravitation* or actual Pressure, and may as fitly be call'd *the Moral Gravitation of the Soul*.

6 I further Consider that this *Moral Gravity* is impress'd upon the Soul primarily and Originally by *good* in *general*, or by the universal good or Essence of good, that is, by God himself, who is the Sum and Abstract of all goodness, and the Centre of all Love. So that this *Moral Gravity* of the Soul
will

will be its *Connaturality* to all good, or good in general, that is, to God as its primary and adequate object, and to particular goods only so far as they have something of the Common Nature of good, something of God in them. Whence it will also follow that the *Moral Gravitation* of the Soul does Naturally and Necessarily respect good in Common or God as the Term of its motion and Tendency. So that upon the whole to speak more *explicitly* the most general and Comprehensive Notion of Love will be found to be, *A motion of the Soul towards God.*

7 But now in this motion there is great difference. For God having unfolded his Perfections in the Creation with almost infinite Variety, and as it were drawn out himself into a numerous issue of *Secondary* goods, our Love becomes also Multiplied, and divides its cours among several Channells, and tho' after all its turnings and windings we may at last trace it up to the πολὺ πέν-

λαγος

λαγος καλῆ as Plato speaks, the *great Sea of Beauty* and Head fountain of all Being and Perfection (For we love Particular goods only as they carry some impress of the universal, or to speak more properly, we love the universal good in the Particulars) yet it must be acknowledg'd that the *immediat object* of our Love becomes hereby more various and Multiplied, and Consequently our *Love* too, as receiving its Specification from it.

8 Nor does our Love receive lesse variety and diversity from the *manner* of its Motion or Tendency, Motion being Specify'd from the *manner* of it as well as from its *Term*. And it may be also lastly diversify'd according to the nature of the *Part* moved, whether it be the Superiour or the Inferiour part of the Soul. From these three, the *Term* of Motion, the *manner* of Motion, and the nature of the *part* moved, arise all the different kinds of Love, such as Divine and Worldly, Spiritual

ritual and Carnal, Charity and Friendship, Love of Concupiscence and Love of Benevolence, Intellectual and Sensitive, Natural, Animal and Rational Love, with several others which I shall not stand to enumerate.

9 But notwithstanding this variety I believe all will be comprehended under these two in general, *Concupiscence* and *Benevolence*. This I take to be the *First* and *great* Division of Love, to which all the several kinds of it may be aptly reduced. For when I Consider the Motion of Love, I find it tends to two things, namely to the good which a man wills to any one, whether it be to himself or to another, and to him to whom this good is will'd. So that the Motion of Love may be Consider'd either barely as a *Tendency* towards good, or as a *willing* this good to some person or Being. If it be consider'd in the first way, then 'tis what we call *Concupiscence* or *Desire*, if in the second, then 'tis what we call *Benevolence* or *Charity*.

10 For

10 For there is the same Proportion in *Love* that there is in *Hatred*, which also involves a *double Motion*. Either a declining or tending from evill, which the Greeks call *Αποτροπή*, the Latins *Fuga*, in our own language *Aversion* or *Abhorrence*, or else a willing evil to some person or other, which we call *Malice* or *Malevolence*. *Concupiscence* or *Desire* answers to the former of these, and *Benevolence* or *Charity* to the Latter.

11 There is indeed this difference to be observ'd between the Motions of Love and the Motions of Hatred, that those of Hatred are not *necessarily Concomitant*. For there may be a simple *Aversion* without any *Malice* or wishing ill to, tho' perhaps the latter can hardly be conceiv'd without the former. But now in Love these Motions are always concomitant and reciprocal. There is no *Desire* without *Benevolence*, and no *Benevolence* without *Desire*. For every thing that is desired is de-

desired to some body, and so again, desiring to some body implies and supposes *simple* Desire. And this I suppose has been the occasion of that great confusion which has been generally incurr'd in this matter, men being very apt from *union* and *Concomitancy* to infer *indistinction* and *Identity*. But notwithstanding this Connexion, the *Ideas* of Desire and Benevolence are very distinct, as will easily and Clearly appear to any close and attentive Thinker.

S E C T.

S E C T. III.

The Analogy between Love and Motion, particularly with the Motion of the Heart, with a further Illustration of the First and Great Division of Love.

I **H**AVING in the foregoing Section fix'd the general Idea of Love in the *Motion* of the Soul towards *good*, and this being a Term somewhat Metaphorical, and withall not so often applied by Scholastic Writers to this purpose, I thought it concern'd me to draw here a short Parallel between *Love* and *Physical Motion*, and to shew the admirable Agreement and Correspondency that is between them: whereby 'twill appear that the general Idea of Love could not have had a more convenient Representation.

2 The excellent *Monsieur Malebranche* undertaking to describe the Nature

ture of the Mind, and considering its Idea to be very abstract, and such as did not fall within the Sphere of Imagination, thought it best to Shadow it forth by the two Eminent Propertys of matter, *viz.* that of receiving various *Figures*, and that of *Motion* or *Mobility*. To the Property of receiving various Figures he resembles that Faculty of the mind which we call *understanding*. And to Motion or Mobility he liken's the *Will*. The first of these Parallels he pursues and illustrates in many Particulars, but when he comes to the last he gives only this one instance of resemblance, that as all Motions Naturally proceed in a right line, unless by the interposition of external and particular causes they are otherwise determin'd, so all the Inclinations which we have receiv'd from God, are *Right*, and would tend only to the true good, were they not turn'd aside to ill ends by the impulse of some *forreign* cause.

Lib. 1. De In-
quirendâ ve-
ritate. P. 2.

3 This indeed is finely observ'd by this Ingenious and Learned *Theorist*, but for an enlargement of the Parallel I consider further, that as in the Motion of Bodys *Gravity* precedes *Actual Gravitation*, that is, we necessarily conceive a certain Congruity or Connaturality of a Body to a certain Term before its actual Tendency thither, so in the Soul there is a Natural *Complacency* or liking of good, before its *actual exerting* it self towards it, for we desire nothing but what we like or relish as convenient and agreeable to us. But this I have touch'd upon already, and shall therefore no longer insist upon it.

4 Further therefore, as this Affection call'd *Gravity* in Bodys, is nothing else but that *first impression* or alteration made upon them by the various actings of those Effluviiums or streames of Particles which issue out from the womb of the great Magnet, the *Earth*, so that if there were either no such Magnetic Body, or a Vacuum to intercept its influences,

fluences, there would be no such thing as Gravity ; so in the like manner this radical *Complacency* and Connaturality of the Soul towards good (which I call her *Moral Gravity*) is nothing else but that first Alteration or Impression which is made upon her by the streaming influences of the Great and Supreme Magnet, *God*, continually acting upon her , and attracting her by his active and powerfull Charms. So that if either there were no God, or this his influence never so little a while intercepted, there would be no such thing as this Complacency or *Moral Gravity* of the Soul.

5 Again , as this Physicall Gravity causes in Bodys an actual Effort or Tendency toward the Centre , and that with such necessity that they cannot but tend thither even while violently detain'd, and when at liberty hasten with all possible speed to this last Term of their Motion, so by Vertue of this Moral Gravity the Soul actually puts
forth

forth and exerts her self towards the *great Magnet*, good in general or God, and that with as much necessity as a stone falls downwards. And tho' detain'd violently by the interposition of her Body, yet still she endeavours towards her Centre, and is no sooner set at liberty but she hastens away to it and unites her self with it. For the will notwithstanding all her Sovereignty and Dominion acts according to Nature and Necessity when she tends to her Perfection. Nay I take this Necessity to be such, that I think it absolutely Impossible for God to Create a Soul without this Tendency to himself, and that not only because 'tis against Order and Decorum that he should do so, but also because this Moral Gravity of the Soul whence proceed all her actual Tendency's, is caused by the continual acting of God upon her by his attractive and Magnetic Influences. For God is the first Mover in Moral as well as in Natural Motions,

and whatever he moves he moves to himself.

6 Again I consider, that as the *Gravitation* or *actual endeavour* of Bodys towards the Centre is always alike and uniform however their *real Progress* may be *hinder'd* or the swiftness of it *resisted* by accidental Letts and impediments, so is this Moral Gravitation or actual indeavour of the Soul towards good in general or God always equal and uniform (for a man does not desire to be Happy more at one time than at another as I have elsewhere Contemp. and Love. p. 296. shewn) I say this endeavour of the Soul towards good is always equal, however her real advancing to it be hinder'd or resisted by the Interposition of the Body.

7 Again I consider, that as Natural Motion is a Tendency or Translation of a Body from an undue and incongruous place to a place of Rest and Acquiescence, whereby it acquires as it were a *new Form* of Perfection, so Love
is

is *Extatical*, and carries a man out from himself as insufficient to be his own good towards good without him, which by union he endeavours to make his *own*, and so to *better* and *improve* his Being, till at length his Desire be swallow'd up in the Fruition of the universal good, and *Motion* be exchanged for *Rest* and *Acquiescence*.

8 This Parallel between *Love* and *Motion* in general might be carried on much further, but besides that 'tis convenient to leave something for the Contemplative Reader to work out by himself, I have also another Parallel to make between Love and a *certain Particular Motion*, namely that of the *Heart*, wherein as there is as much Harmony and Correspondency in other respects, so there is this peculiar in it, that this is a Motion perform'd *within* a man's *self*, and depending upon an *intrinsic* and *vital* Principle as well as the other.

9 First then we may Consider that
the

the Heart is the great Wheel of the Humane Machine, the Spring of all Animal and vital Motion, and the Head-fountain of Life, πηγή Φύσεως as *Hippocrates* somewhere calls it, and that its Motion is the First and Leading Motion of all, that it begins as soon as the Flame of Life is Kindled, and ends not till the *vital Congruity* be quite dissolv'd. And thus 'tis in *Love*. This is the great wheel of the *Intellectual* frame as the other is of the *Natural*, this is the Spring and Ferment of the Soul, that gives her Life and Energy, and without which she would be utterly torpid and unactive. Love is the first and *Mother* Motion that both prevents and actuates all the rest. 'Tis from her that all the Inclinations and Passions of the Soul take their rise, and did we not first love we should neither Hope nor Fear, nor hate nor be Angry, nor Envy nor be any other way affected. Nay we Love and Desire before we can Apprehend, Judge, Rea-

Reason or Discourse, nay our Love is then Commonly most impetuous and high-set ; we love long before we know what 'tis to Love, nay before we know whether we love or no, even as soon as we receive the Breath of Life. And as 'tis the *First*, so it is also the *Last* Motion. 'Tis the *Ultimum Moriens* of the Intellectual, as the Heart is of the Natural Structure. This is the Motion that out lives and sees the Funeral of all the other Operations of the Soul. For when either Age or sickness by disturbing the Crasis of the Body has also untuned and disorder'd the Facultys of the Soul, when the man can no longer understand, nor Discourse, nor Remember, when all his Rational Facultys are as 'twere benumm'd and *death-struck*, yet still he *Loves*, and inclines towards Happiness with as much weight as ever ; *for Love is strong* Can. *as Death*, and as Importunate as the *Grave*, many waters cannot quench Love, neither can the Floods drown it

10 Again we may consider, that as by the *Pulſation* of the *Heart* the Arterial blood is tranſmitted to the Brain, whereby are generated thoſe Animal Spirits which are the Inſtruments of Motion throughout the Body, and which very Animal Spirits do again return and aſſiſt the Motion of the Heart by Contracting its Muſcular Fibres, and ſo ſtraitning its Ventricles to expel the blood contain'd in them into the Arteries; the ſame Reciprocation may we obſerve in the Motion of Love. That Moral Gravity and Gravitation of the Soul impreſs'd on her by the univerſal Good acting attractively upon her, and whereby ſhe ſtands inclined to good in general, firſt moves the underſtanding, which as the Schools allow, is moved by the will *quoad exercitium actus*, tho' not *quoad ſpecificationem*. And then the underſtanding Moves the will as to *particular* and actual Volitions concerning particular Goods. For as to *theſe* we will nothing but what we firſt

first know and judge pro hic & nunc fit to be will'd. Which by the way may give great light to that intricate and perplex'd Controversy, whether the will moves the understanding or the understanding the will. For they both move one another, tho' in different respects. Even as the Heart by its Motion sends Spirits to the Brain, and is by those very Spirits assisted in her Motion. This indeed is a wonderful instance of Resemblance, and the more I consider it the more strange I think it, and full of Mystery.

II Again as by the Continual Reciprocation of the *Pulse* there is caused a Circulation of the Blood, which is expell'd out of the Heart into the Arteries, out of these into the parts which are to be Nourish'd, from whence 'tis imbibed by the Capillary Veins, which lead it back to the Vena Cava and so into the Heart again; the same may in proportion be applied to Love. This is the *Great Pulse* of the *Body Politic*,
as

as the other is of the *Body Natural*. 'Tis Love that begets and Keeps up the great Circulation and Mutual Dependence of Society, by this Men are inclined to maintain Mutual Commerce and intercourse with one another, and to distribute their Benefits and Kindnesses to all the parts of the Civil Body, till at length they return again upon themselves in the *Circle and Reciprocation of Love*.

12 And if we further Meditate upon the Motion of the Heart we shall find that it is not only an apt Embleme of *Love in General*, but that it also Mystically points out to us the *two great Species* of Love, *Concupiscence and Benevolence*. The Motion of the Heart we know is Double, *Dilatation* and *Contraction*. Dilatation whereby it receives blood into its Ventricles, and Contraction whereby it expels it out again. And is it not so also in this great Pulse of the Soul, *Love*? Is there not here also the like double Motion? For we
desire

desire good, which answers to the Dilatation and immiſſion of the Blood, and we alſo *wiſh well to*, which answers to the Contraction and Emiſſion of it.

13 I know not what ſome may think of this, and I know there are a ſort of men in the world that never think themſelves, and look with Scorn and Contempt upon ſuch Notions as are not to be found out without more than Ordinary Thinking; But for my part I muſt needs own that I ſtand amazed at this wonderful Harmony and Correſpondence, and that I am thereby the more Confirm'd in that Celebrated Notion of the *Platonists*, that as the Soul is the Image of God, ſo the Body is the Image of the Soul, and that this Viſible and Material is but the *Shadow*, or (as *Plotinus* will have it) the *Echo* of the Inviſible and Immaterial World.

S E C T. IV.

Of the First Great Branch of Love viz. Love of Concupiscence or Desire, with the several Kinds of it.

I **W**E have Consider'd the Nature of Love in general, and have shewn it to Consist in a *Motion of the Soul towards Good*, whence we took occasion to represent the Analogy between Love and Physical Motion, which we find to be exact and Apposite even to Surprise and admiration; We have also discover'd the double Motion of this Mystical Pulse, and accordingly have branch'd out Love into two General Parts, Love of Concupiscence and Love of Benevolence. I come now to treat of each of these severally.

2 And first of Love of *Concupiscence* or *Desire*. The general Idea of which
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I conceive to be *A simple Tendency of the Soul to good*, not at all considering whether it wills it to any Person or Being or no. Not that there is or can be any desire without wishing well to, (For as I observ'd before these are always inseperable Concomitants) but their Ideas being very distinct, I think I may very well abstract from the one, when my business lies only to consider the other.

3 Concerning this Love of Desire I further consider, that the Primary and Adequate object of it is the same that is of all Love, namely *good in general* or *God*. For we desire good as good, or good in Common, before we desire this or that good in particular. And when we *do* desire any particular good, 'tis still for the sake of the universal good whereof it partakes, and according to the degree of this Participation either real or apparent so we measure out and dispence our Love. So that good in general is the Primary and Adequate object of Desire.

4 But

4 But now this general or universal good being variously participated by Particular Beings, hence it comes to pass that our Desire has many Subordinate and Secondary objects, which it tends to with more or less Inclination according as the Marks and Footsteps of the universal good appear in them more or less discernable. For the universal good is so Congenial and Connatural to the Soul as always acting upon it and attracting it to it self, that we love every thing that carries the least image or semblance of it.

5 There is this difference only between the love of the universal, and the love of Particular goods. Our love to the universal good is Natural, necessary and unavoidable. We have no more Command over this love than we have over the Circulation of our Blood or the Motion of our Pulse. For God is the Centre of Spirits, as the Earth is of Bodys, and in our love of him we are as much determin'd as
Fire

Fire is to burn, or a stone to descend. And the Blessed in Heaven Love him with the highest degree of Necessity and Determination. But now we are not thus determin'd to the Love of Particular goods. I say not *thus* determin'd. For it must be acknowledg'd that there is a sort of determination even *here* also. For good being desirable as good and consequently in *every degree* of it, so far as we consider any thing as good we must needs Love it with a *Natural Inclination*, that which the Schools term a *Velleity* or *Voluntas Naturæ*, or a loving a thing *Secundum quid*, according to a certain respect; But it being possible that this Lesser Particular good may in some circumstances come into Competition with a greater Particular good or with the greatest of all, the universal good, and so upon the whole become evill, 'tis not necessary, nor are we determin'd to love it absolutely, thoroughly and efficaciously, but may nill and

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decline it *Absolutely*, tho' still we retain a *Natural Love* or *Velleity* towards it as before.

6 For the case is the same here as 'tis in Evill. We necessarily hate evill as evill, and the greatest evill we hate *Absolutely* as well as *necessarily*. But for particular and lesser evils, tho' we necessarily hate them too by a *Natural Aversion* as far as we Consider them as *evill*, yet 'tis not necessary that we should always hate them *Absolutely*, but may in some Circumstances *Absolutely* will them as a means either to avoid a greater evil, or to obtain a greater good. And in the same proportion as any evil less than the greatest tho' it be necessarily nill'd and declined in some *respect*, may yet be *Absolutely* will'd and embraced, so any Particular good tho' it be in some *respect* necessarily lov'd, may yet *Absolutely* be nill'd and refused.

7 Indeed the Excellent *Monsieur Malebranche* in his *Treatise of Nature* and

and grace, asserts this non Determination of our Love to Particular goods in more large and unlimited terms, when he tells us, that *the Natural Motion of the Soul to good in general, is not invincible in respect of any Particular good.* And in this *non Invincibility* he places our *Liberty* or Free will. But in my Judgement this Proposition of his must either be *Corrected*, or *better explain'd.* For without this our Distinction, it will not hold true. Our Love to Particular good is Invincible *Secundum quid* or as to a certain *respect*, but *Absolutely* and simply speaking it is not Invincible. And if in this *Absolute non Invincibility* he will have our Liberty or Free will to consist, I readily agree with him, and do think the Notion to be very sound and good.

8 And thus the Difference between our Love of the universal, and our Love of Particular goods is clear and apparent. Our Love to the universal good is Primary and Immediate, but

our Love to Particular good Secondary and Mediate. Our Love to the universal good is invincible *Absolutely* and *Simply*, we will it *necessarily*, and we will *thoroughly*, but our love to Particular good is invincible only in *some certain respect*. We do not always love it thoroughly and effectually, tho' we must always love it. In short, our love to the universal good is like the Motion of our Blood within our veins, which we have no manner of empire or Command over, but our Love to Particular good is like the Motion of *Respiration*, partly necessary, and partly Free. We cannot live without Breathing at all, and yet we can suspend any one turn of Respiration in particular, but yet not without a natural inclination to the Contrary. And so in like manner we can't live without loving some particular good or other, but when we point to this or that particular good, there is not one but what we may nill and refuse *Absolutely and simply*,

simply, tho' yet in some respect we must love it too, with a *Natural Love*.

9 Thus far I have Consider'd the general nature of this First great Branch of Love, Love of Concupiscence or Desire. I come now to the *Kinds* of it. For the right distribution of which I consider first that any Motion of the Soul is specify'd from the *Quality* of the *Object* or *Term* to which it tends. Now the Object of Desire being good it follows that the *Kinds* of *Desire* must receive their distinction from the *Kinds* of *good*. Now good is *Relative*, and the Relation that it implies is a Relation of *Convenience* either to the Soul or Body, that is, either to the Soul Directly and Immediately, or Indirectly and by the Mediation of Bodily sensations. So that all good is either *Intellectual* or *sensual*, and consequently the same Members of Division will be the adequate Distribution of *Desire*. That is an Intellectual Desire whose *Object* is an Intellectual good, and a sensual

sual Desire is that whose *Object* is a sensual good.

10 But I further observe, that this same denomination of Intellectual and sensitive may be taken from the *Nature* of the *part moved* as well as from the *quality* of the *Object*. The *Appetitive Faculty* in man is double as well as the *Cognoscitive*, and consists of a Superior and Inferiour, of a Rational and sensitive part. For as in the *Cognoscitive* part there is *Pure Intellect* whereby Ideas are Apprehended without any Corporeal Image, and *Imagination* whereby objects are presented to our minds under some Corporeal Affection, so also in the *Appetitive* there is a pure and mere act of Tendency or Propension to the agreeable object, which answers to Pure Intellect and is what we call *Will* or *Volition*, and there is also such a propension of the Soul as is accompany'd with a Commotion of the Blood and Spirits, and this answers to Imagination, and is the same with what

what we usually term the *Passion* of *Love*. And 'tis in the divided Tendency or Discord of these two wherein consists that *Lucta* or Contention between the *Flesh* and *Spirit*. That which our B. Lord intimated when he sayd *The Spirit truly is willing, but the Flesh is weak*, and which *St. Paul* calls the *Law of the Mind* and the *Law of* Rom. 7. *the Members*. I say in the *Divided* Tendency of these two. Because sometimes the Intellectual and Sensitive Appetite may both point one way, and conspire in the same object, as it does either in men very wicked, who sin with *unity* and *intireness* of *Consent* without any Check or Remorse from the Superior part, or in men Eminently good, who have reduced even their very *bodily* Inclinations to the *order of the Spirit*, and have attain'd to the highest degree of *Mortification* and *simplification* of Desire.

II And it may yet be observ'd further, that so far as this Denomination
of

of Intellectual and Sensitive is taken both from the quality of the Object, and from the part moved, our Desire may be at the same time both Intellectual and Sensitive. For that Desire which is *Intellectual* in respect of the *Part* may be also *sensitive* in respect of the *Object*, (For we may *Will* a sensual good as well as *Passionately* Desire it) and so on the other side, that Desire which is *sensitive* in respect of the *Part* may be *Intellectual* in respect of the *Object*. For there may be a *sensitive* Appetite of an *Intellectual* good, and we may love even God himself *Passionately* as well as *Rationally*.

12 Thus is Love of Desire divided in general into *Intellectual* and *sensual*. But as for the particular kinds under these they are almost infinite, and therefore I shall not offer at a distinct recital of them. I shall only remarque some few things concerning *Intellectual Love*, and by the way shall also briefly touch upon the *principal* and most

most eminent species of *sensual Love*, and to end this Section.

13 And first concerning Intellectual Love, I consider that the general Object of it is τὸ καλὸν or Beauty. For Intellectual Love is that whose object is an Intellectual good, and an Intellectual good is that which pleases the Intellect, and the Intellect is pleas'd with nothing but as 'tis *Proportionable*, *Harmonious* and some way or other *Beautifull*. Whence it follows that Intellectual Love has Beauty in general for its proper Object.

14. But then this Beauty which is the proper Object of Intellectual Love, is either the *First and Original Beauty*, or *Created and Derivative Beauty*; if the First and Original Beauty, then the love of it is *Divine Love*, and if this be in a very high degree such as is the Product of an intense Contemplation, then 'tis what we call *Seraphic Love*, which is the greatest Exaltation, and Perfection of *Intellectual Love*, and
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withall the *greatest Happiness* the Soul of man is capable of in this State, as I have shewn at large See Idea of Happiness. in another Treatise.

15 But if it be *Created and Derivative* Beauty, then I consider that either we *Ascend* by and from the love of it to the love of the First and Originary Beauty, or else we *stick there*, or we *Descend* to the desire of Corporal Contact, and the delight arising from it. If we take Occasion to Ascend, then 'tis what we call *Platonic Love*, which (as I have elsewhere more at large explain'd the Notion) is the Ascent of the Soul to the love of the Divine Beauty from the Aspect of Beauty in Bodys. But if we terminate and stick in this sensible Form or Pulchritude, tho' this Affection be not so noble and generous as that which ascends higher, yet still this is *pure Intellectual Love*, so long as 'tis free from all desire of Corporal Application, and for distinction's sake may be call'd the Love of *Abstracted Beauty*.

16 And

16 And let not any one think it strange that I make this *Abstract Love* of sensitive Beauty an *Intellectual Love*. For Beauty let the subject of its inherence be what it will, consists in *Harmony* and *Proportion* which is the immediate good of the Soul, that only being capable both of understanding it, and of being *primarily* affected with it. And tho' we give it the name of *Sensible Beauty*, yet that is only because the senses are the Instruments of *Conveiances*, not as being the part *primely* affected, and to distinguish it from those Beautys which are *immediately* Intelligible, such as the Beauty of *Truth*, the Beauty of *Vertue* and the like; But in reference to the Part directly and immediately affected all Beauty, even Sensible Beauty is an Intellectual good, and is one of the fainter Rays of the Divine glory, one of the remoter Mirours that reflect the Supreme and Original Beauty.

17 The Sublime Platonist *Marsilius Ficinus*

Ficinus has a fine Notion to this purpose. He takes the First Beauty to be nothing else but the Splendour of Gods Glory, and of this he says there is a threefold Reflection. For he supposes Angelical Minds, Rational Souls, and Beautiful Bodys as three Glasses of different Colours, which reflect this one and the same light after different Manners. His words are, *Ipsa certe Pulcritudo Prima nihil aliud est quam Splendor Gloriæ penes Patrem luminum, & Figura Substantiæ ejus. Unde triplex emicat Pulcritudo. Prima quidem per Angelicos Intellectus, secunda vero per Intellectuales animas, tertia per Corpora ubique formosa quasi lumen unum per tria quædam vitra Coloribus inter se varia, ideoque varium ex Primo Splendorem subinde reddentia. The First Beauty Certainly is nothing else but the Splendour of Glory with the Father of Lights, and the Figure of his substance. Whence there shines forth a threefold Beauty. The First*

Lib. de Lumine
Tom. 1. Cap. 14.
P. 1006.

First through the Angelical Minds, the second thro' Intelligent Souls, the third thro' Beautifull Bodys, which reflect the same Light as it were through three Glasses of different Colours, and accordingly they successively reflect a different splendour from the First. So that sensible and Corporeal Beauty is one of the Glasses that reflect and represent the First Beauty, and tho' it must be confess'd that we see through this Glass darkly, yet still it represents according to its proportion, and is only as a Picture remotely drawn after several Copies, a weaker and further projected Ray of God. And therefore it must needs be an Intellectual good, and Consequently the Love of it, if abstracted from Corporal Applications, must also be a pure Intellectual Love.

18 But if we do not stick and terminate here, but are by the aspect of sensible Beauty precipitated down to the desire of Corporal Contact, and the pleasure thence arising, then this is
sensual

sensual Love, that is, a desire of a sensual good. I may add of the *greatest* sensual good, and Consequently that this is the *most* sensual Love. And 'tis so Common with men thus to *descend*, rather than love *Platonically* or *Abstractedly*, that the name of love is almost wholly appropriated to *this* Affection, and *to be in Love* signifies as much as to be inclined to *Corporal Contact* by the Occasion of Corporeal Beauty. As if there were no other good but *this* Kind of *sensual* good, and no other love but *this sensual Love*. And accordingly *Plato* in his *symposion* distinguishing between his *two Cupids*, Intellectual and sensual Love, stiles the *Latter* by the name of Ἐρως Πανδημιος, the *Vulgar* or *Epidemical Love*.

19 Indeed this is a very strange Affection, and has so universally prevail'd as to turn all other Love almost out of the World. This is a Passion that has made more slaves than the greatest Conquerours, more stir and disturbance

sturbance in the world than either *Ambition*, *Pride* or *Covetousness*, and has caused more Sin and Folly than the united force of all the Powers of Darkness. It has wounded almost as many as *Death*, and devour'd like a *Contagion* or the *Grave*. It makes no distinction, the wise man is as little secure from it as the Fool, Age submits to it as well as youth, the strong as well as the weak, the Hero as well as the Coward. In fine, this one Passion sets on fire the whole course of Nature, rages and spreads with an unlimited Contagion, and is an Image of the *universal Conflagration*.

20 And that which increases the wonder is the vileness of that structure which is made the Object of this sensual Love. 'Tis not indeed much to be wonder'd that we should love Corporeal Pleasure, all Pleasure being in its Proportion lovely, but that the embracing such poor Materials should afford any, *that's* the wonder. Should one
Angel

Angel fall in love with the pure and refined Vehicle of another, tho' Matter even in its *highest* Exaltation is but a poor sort of Being, there would however be something of Proportion in this: but to see a man Idolize and dote upon a Masse of *Flesh* and *Blood*, that which the Apostle calls *our Vile Body*, Phil. 3. Or as 'tis in the Original more Emphatically, *σῶμα ἡ ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν* *the body of our Humiliation*, that is at present the *Reversion* of Worms, and may the very next Minute be a *Carcase*, this is indeed so strange to one that thoughtfully considers it, that one would think all Mankind were intoxicated with some general *Philtrum* or Love Potion, that has thus Charm'd them into this most stupid and Wretched degree of *Idolatry*. So that whether we consider the *greatness* of the *Effects*, or the *slendernefs* of the *Cause*, this Kind of sensual Love is of all the most wonderful and unaccountable.

21 One thing more I have to observe

serve concerning this Kind of sensual Love, the Desire of Corporal Contact occasion'd by the Aspect of sensible Beauty, and that is, that this is a Passion peculiar to *Man*. *Brutes* are below it, and *Angels* are above it. For Man being a middle sort of Creature between an Angel and a Beast, 'tis requisite he should have something to distinguish him from each, and that in his *Appetitive* as well as in his *Intellective* Part. And thus it is, in his *Intellective* part he has *Reason* and *Discourse*, which is above *sensible knowledge*, and short of *Intuition*. And so likewise in his *Appetitive* there is this Desire of Corporal Contact arising from the sight of Beauty, which is a *mixt* Love, partly Intellectual and partly sensual, and is thereby distinguish'd from the Love of *Brutes*, which is purely sensual (for they are not affected with *Beauty*) and the love of *Angels* which is purely Intellectual. So great Harmony and Proportion is there in the works' of him

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who

who made all things in *Number, Weight, and Measure.*

S E C T. V.

Of the Second Great Branch of Love viz. Love of Benevolence, its division into Self-Love and Charity, where also 'tis enquired whether all Love be Self-Love.

I **H**AVING dispatch'd the First great Branch of Love, Love of Concupiscence or Desire, with the several Kinds of it, I come now to consider the Second, *viz.* Love of Benevolence. By this I understand a desiring or willing of good to some Person or Being that is Capable of it. And herein 'tis differenc'd from Love of Concupiscence. The Idea of Love of Concupiscence is, *A simple Tendency of the Soul to good,* not at all considering whether it wills it to any Person or Being or no. But the Idea of Benevolence is *A desiring or willing this good to some Being or other.*

As

As far as 'tis a *Desiring* or willing of good, it agrees with Love of Concupiscence, but it is distinguish'd from it in that it *wishes well too*.

2. For as in Physical Motion a Body may be consider'd either as simply moving towards another, or as moving this other to some Certain Body, so in Love which is a *Moral Motion*, the Soul may be consider'd either as simply desiring or willing good (which is *Concupiscence*) or as desiring or willing it to some Capable Being, and this is that Species of Love which we call *Benevolence*.

3 And I further Meditate that as in Motion the Body that moves another may either move it towards it self as in *Circular Motion*, or towards some other Body as in *Direct Motion*. So in the Love of Benevolence this wishing well to, may either be a willing of good to *ones self*, or to *some other Being*. If to *ones self*, then 'tis that special sort of Benevolence which we call *self-love*.

If to another, then 'tis what we call *Charity*.

4 Then again as to *Charity*, this may be consider'd either as extended to all men in Common, grounded upon one Common Consideration, *viz.* Similitude of Nature, and a Capacity of being benefitted, which is *Common Charity*; Or as confined to one or two, and as Mutual, and as Mutually known, and withall as in a special degree of Intensity and Application, and then 'tis *Friendship*, which differs not from Common *Charity* but as 'tis qualify'd by the preceding modifications.

5 But this our Division is in danger of being closed up again by some who contract all these kinds of Benevolence into one, by telling us that *all Love* is *self-Love*. Thus the *Epicureans* of old, who by this Plea thought to evade the necessity of owning a Providence. For when you argue from the Perfections of God that the world is cared for and govern'd by him; No say they, the quite

quite contrary follows. For all Love is self-Love, and proceeds from *Indigency*, if therefore God be such a *Full* and *Perfect* being as you suppose, he cannot be concern'd for any thing abroad, as having no self-interest to serve.

6 And indeed the *Conclusion* would be right, were the *Principle* so. For if all Benevolence did proceed from Indigence, it would certainly follow that the more perfect and self-sufficient any being is, the less he must needs regard the good of others, and consequently a being that is *absolutely* perfect, must necessarily be *utterly* void of all Benevolence or Concern for anothers welfare.

7 But to hear an *Epicurean* Maintain this Principle is no wonder. Even *Plato* himself in some places seems to look favourably towards it, particularly in his *Lysis*, where purposely treating of Friendship he concludes toward the end of the Dialogue that Friendship arises from Indigence, necessity and pri-

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vation.

vation. The same he again insinuates in his *symposion*, when he makes Penia Indigence or Poverty to be the Mother of Love. But the *Roman Plato*, *Cicero*, in his book of Friendship will by no means allow this Notion, but contends that Love proceeds rather from *Nature*, than from Indigence or Imbecility.

8 There is in the other opinion something of Truth, and something of Error, or rather 'tis either true or false as 'tis understood. How far true and how far false, I shall determin in the following Conclusions. And first I do acknowledge that all Love of *Concupiscence* does proceed from Indigence, and ends in self-Love. For all desire is in order to further Perfection, and Improvement, and did we not want something *within*, we should not endeavour towards any thing *without*. And accordingly God, the self-sufficiency of whose Nature excludes all want of Indigency, is by no means capable of Love of *Concupiscence*.

9 Again

9 Again I acknowledge that even Love of Benevolence or Charity *may* be, and (such is our Present Infirmary) is for the most part occasion'd by Indigence, and when unravel'd to the bottom concludes in self-love. Our Charity not only *begins* at home, but for the most part *ends* there too. For it must be confess'd that we generally love others with respect to our own interest, and dispense kindneses upon the consideration of common Infirmary, and that both the *Condition* and the *Relief* may be our own another day.

10 I do also further acknowledge that things are so happily twisted and complicated together, that a man cannot benefit another without doing some kindness to himself, either in the *Consequence* & final issue of things, or in the *very act* of Benefaction, it being not only a Pleasure to do good to others, but perhaps one of the greatest pleasures in the world. And this Pleasure is withal inseparable from acts of kindness,

ness, so that 'tis as impossible for a man to bestow a kindness to his Neighbour, without having it some way or other redound to himself; as 'tis for the Sun to shine upon the Earth, without having his light reflected back again toward his own Orb.

II All this is true, and thus far I grant that Love proceeds from Indigence, and that all love is self-love. But if the Meaning of the Assertion be that all love of Benevolence does so *necessarily* depend upon Indigence and so necessarily point to self interest, that were not a man Indigent himself, and had an eye to his own advantage, he could not possibly wish well or do well to another, in this sense I deny that all love is self love. And I think not without just reason. For first there is nothing in the *Nature of the thing* to hinder but that there may be a *pure and disinterested* Benevolence. For I consider that the good of another consider'd as *another's* may be the object of
voli-

volition as well as ones own. For the object of Volition is good in common, or that which is agreeable to any Intellectual being, whether ones self or any other. But now good as anothers or to another, is good as well as ones own, and therefore may be the object of Volition, and consequently we may will good to another independently on our own Interest.

12 If it be objected that there is no such thing as *Pure Malice*, for when we wish ill to another we consider his evil as making for own good, and therefore why should there be any such thing as *Pure Benevolence*. I answer, the difference lies in this. That in *Malice* the thing which we wish to another is *evil*. Now evil being not any way desirous whether to ones self or another, as *evil*, it must in order to eligibility be considered under the formality of *good* in some respect or other. But now it cannot have the formality of good with respect to our *Neighbor*, for to *him* we wish

with it as *Evil*. It must therefore appear good with reference to *our selves*. That is, we consider anothers evil as making for our good some way or other, and so will it to him. But now in Charity or Benevolence the thing which we will to another being supposed to be good already, there is no necessity that in order to the willing of it we should further consider it under the formality of being *our own*. The Nature of *good* in *Common* being sufficient for that. And this I conceive to be the reason that although there cannot be a *Pure* and *uninterested Malice*, yet there may be a *Pure* and *uninterested Charity*.

13 Besides, this Love of Benevolence is frequently exercised without any *design* of Prospect; nay sometimes where there is no *possibility* of any self advantage. This is plain in God, who as he is the most *self-sufficient* and *unbenefitable*, so is he also the most *Beneficient* and *Communicative* Being. And
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I question not but that it may be so in Men also. For not to mention our doing kindneses to those, whom we are certain never to see again, to dying persons, who cannot live to requite us, or to the living when we ourselves are dying, and can't live to be requited, and the like, I only consider, that we often rejoice at the Happiness of those who were born and lived before us, and hear with pleasure the successes of good Men, with whom (as being of another Age) our Interest cannot be at all concern'd. Now what we rejoice at we do implicitly and virtually Will, for nothing can be matter of Joy which is not according to our *will*.

14 Lastly I consider that if all Benevolence did necessarily spring from Indigence and self-love, then it would certainly follow that our Inclination to do good would be continually abated as our Fortune rises, and we make nigher advances to Fullness and Self-suffici-


Self-sufficiency. But now I dare appeal to Common Observation and Experience, whether there be not many generous Spirits, who retain the same Propension to be beneficial, when they are set at the greatest distance from Poverty, as they had before when at the lowest Ebb, which yet could never be, if Benevolence did necessarily depend on Indigence. More I might add, but this I think sufficient to shew that all Love is not, as some pretend, resolvable into Self-love, or Founded upon Indigence, and consequently that my Division of Benevolence into *Self Love* and *Charity* is sufficiently accurate and contra-distinct.

T H E

THE
SECOND PART
Of the Discourse

WHICH
CONTAINS THE MEASURES
whereby our Love is to be re-
gulated.

*Hitherto shalt thou come, but no fur-
ther, and here shall thy proud Waves
be stayed, Job. 38. 11.*



P A R T. II.

S E C T. I.

That Love requires some Measures of Regulation, and why love as Dirigible is made the subject of Morality rather than understanding.

HAVING finish'd the *Theory of Love*, I come now to consider the *Measures of its Regulation*. A great and important work this; for next to the *Regulating* of our Love, I know nothing either more difficult or more useful and necessary, than to prescribe Measures how it *ought* to be Regulated. Indeed it is very Necessary to fix the Bounds of Regulating our Love; and that both because of the *Difficulty* of Loving Regularly, and because of the *Moment and Consequence* of it.

2 For

2 For the Difficulty, as tis impossible not to love at all, so is it one of the Hardest things in the world to love well. *Solus sapiens scit Amare*, says the Stoic, *The wise man only knows how to Love*. And there are very few of these wise Men in the World, and to love regularly is oftentimes more than the wisest of us all can do. For first the Appetite which we have to good in General is so strong and Craving that it hurries us on to all sorts and degrees of Particular good, and makes us fasten wherever we can trace the least Print or Foot-step of the universal good. Now this Promiscuous and Indefinite prosecution of Particular goods must needs oftentimes engage us in sin and irregularity. For though these particular objects of Love *separately* considered are good, as being Participations of the universal good, yet consider'd as they stand in *relation* either to *one another* or to the *universal*, they may become evil, in as much as there may

may be a *Competition*, and the the lesser may hinder the greater. As for instance, The pleasure of sense (as indeed all Pleasure) singly and separately consider'd is good, but the enjoyment of it may in some circumstances be against a greater good, the good of Society, and then 'tis evil as in *Fornication* or *Adultery*. But now we are so violently push'd on to Particular good, by that General Thirst after good in Common, that we don't mind how things are in *Combination*, but only how they are *singly* and *separately* in themselves. For to observe how things are in *Combination* requires *thought* and *Reflexion*, which in this Hurry we are not at leisure to make, but to find how things are *Singly* in themselves there needs nothing but *direct Taste* and *natural sensation*. Whence it comes to pass that we more readily do the one than the other, and so are very apt to transgress order, and to love *irregularly*.

3 This is one ground of the Difficulty of Loving well, and as I conceive a very considerable one, tho' no one that I know of did ever assign this as the cause of this difficulty. But there is also another. For as from the love of good in general we are eagerly carried out to Particular goods, so from the Original Pravity and Degeneracy of our Nature, among all these Particular goods, that which we most eagerly propend to, is *sensual good*. The Lower life is now highly invigorated and awaken'd in us, *the Corruptible Body* (as the wise man complains) *presses down the Soul*, and the Love, which we have to good in general, does now by the Corruption of our Nature almost wholly display and exert it self in the prosecution of this one Particular good, the *good of Sense*.

4. Now though good of Sense be as truly good as good of the Intellect, as being a Rivulet of the same Sea, and a Ray of the same Sun, yet (as I said before)

before) it may in some Circumstances and Combinations cross and thwart some higher Interest, and so become Evil. And the strong inclination, which we now have to the good of Sense in general, will often betray us into the love and enjoyment of it in *those particular* circumstances wherein it is evil, and against Order. And that oftentimes, even when we consider it as Evil, that is, when we do not only mind it as it is *singly* in it self, but as it is in a *certain Combination*. For this Sensual Concupiscence in us may be so strong, that though we do actually consider a sensual pleasure so circumstantiated as *Evil*, yet we may for that time think it a *lesser Evil* than to deny our selves the gratification of so importunate an Appetite, and so chuse it, and be guilty of an exorbitant and irregular Love.

5 And if we further consider how we are perpetually surrounded with sensible goods , which by Troops thrust themselves upon us, while those

that are Intellectual require our *Search* and *Inquisition*, how early they attack us, and what deep impressions they make upon our then *tender* Faculties, how much the *Animal* part is *afore-hand* with the *Rational*, that we live the life of *Plants* and *Beasts* before we live the life of *men*, and that not only in the sense of *Aristotle*, while we are in the *Womb*, but long after we have beheld the *Sun*, that the *Seducer Eve* is Form'd while *Adam* sleeps, and that sensuality comes to be *Adult* and *Mature*, when our *Discourses* are but *young* and *imperfect*. So that by that time we arrive to some competent use of our *Reason*, there has been laid in such a stock of *Animal* impressions, that 'tis more than work enough for our *riper Age*, even to *unravel* the prejudices of our youth, and *unlive* our former life; I say if we consider this, the *Difficulty* of *Regular love* will appear so great, that instead of admiring at the ill course of the *World*, one should

should rather be tempted to wonder that men love so regularly as they do. So great Reason had the Stoic to say, *The wise man only knows how to love.*

6 But were it onely a piece of *Difficulty* to steer the Ship right, and were there not also *danger* of splitting against Rocks, and of other ill Contingencys, the Pilot might yet be secure and unconcern'd, commit *himself* to his *Pillow*, and his *Vessel* to the *Winds*. But 'tis otherwise, there is *Moment* and Consequence in Loving regularly as well as *Difficulty*. No less a thing than Happiness depends upon it, private Happiness and publick Happiness, the Happiness of single Persons, and the the Happiness of the Community, the Happiness of this world, and the Happiness of the next.

7 For as Motion is in the Natural, so is Love in the Moral world. And as the good state of the Natural World depends upon those *Laws* of *Regular Motion*, which God has establish'd in it,

it, in so much that there would need nothing else to bring all into confusion and destruction, but the irregular Motion of those Bodies which it consists of, so does the welfare and happy state of the Intellectual world depend upon the *Regularity of Love*. According as this Motion proceeds, so is the Moral world either an Harmonical Frame, or a disorderly Chaos, and there needs nothing but the Irregularity of Love to undermine the Pillars of Happiness, and to put the *Foundations of the Intellectual World out of Course*. And accordingly we see that God who loves Order, and takes care for the perfection of *both* worlds, has prescribed both *Laws of Motion* and *Laws of Love*. And for the same reason 'tis a thing of great importance and necessity to state these Laws and Measures, the welfare of the Moral world being as much concern'd in *Love*, as that of the natural is in *Motion*.

8 And this is the Reason why *Love as Dirigible* is made the subject of Morality rather than *understanding*. For the Happiness of life is not so much concern'd in the Acts of our understanding, as in the Acts of our Love; indeed not at all in our understanding any further, than as our understanding affects our Love, and opinion influences practise. And then indeed it is, which is the ground of that Obligation to *Orthodoxy*, which we are under as to those Articles of Faith which are call'd *Fundamental*. Otherwise in matters of pure Speculation the happiness of Society is not at all concern'd in what we think, as for instance in that Celebrated Mathematical Problem, *whether the pertual Approximation of some lines be consistent with the impossibility of their Concourse*, what does it signify to the good estate of Society which way this be held? 'Tis indifferent therefore which side we take. But now we can't advance one step in the
Motion

Motion of Love, but something or other comes on't in relation to Political Happinels, as there is not the least Motion in Nature but what tends either to *Generation* or *Corruption*. For the difference is this, the Acts of our understanding are *Immanent*, and ineffective of any alteration upon things without us, but the Acts of Love are *Transient*, and leave external and permanent effects behind them in the course of things, and for this reason Love, as Dirigible, is made the Immediate and proper subject of Moral consideration, and understanding is here no otherwise concern'd than as it influences and determines our love. What the Measures of regulating our love are, I come now to define.

SECT.

S E C T. II.

The Measures of Love of Concupiscence, all reduced to these two general Heads, what we must desire, and what we may desire; The Measures of these, both in general and in Particular. Whether sensual Pleasure be in its self evil, with an account of the true Notion of Original Concupiscence and of Mortification.

I **B**EING now to define the Measures of Love, I shall first begin with Love of Concupiscence. And here I consider that *Duty* and *Liberty* divide between them the Bounds of Morality, which ought wholly to be taken up in the consideration of these two things, what we *must* or *ought* to do, and what we *may* do without being Peccant. And accordingly I shall reduce all the Measures of Love of Concupiscence to these two general Heads, what we *must* desire, and what we *may* desire.

2 Con-

2 Concerning the first, all that we *must* desire will I suppose be comprehended under these three, God, the good of the Community, and all those things which have a Natural Connexion with it. God, as the greatest and last End *Absolutely* and *Simply*, the good of the Community, as the greatest of *Subordinate* Ends, and all those things which have a Natural Connexion with it, as *Means* without which 'tis not to be obtain'd. Wherein is also comprehended the obligation of not desiring, or avoiding whatever has naturally a contrary or opposite Tendency.

3 The first thing which we must love or desire is *God*. But now God may be loved two waies, either *confusely* and *implicitly*, or *distinctly* and *explicitly*. The confuse and implicit Love of God is Natural and necessary, for 'tis the same with the love of good in common or Happiness, to which our Nature is Originally and invincibly deter-

determin'd, and consequently cannot be Morally obliged. But that which we are here obliged to, is to love or desire him distinctly and explicitly, that is, to contract and centre that Natural and Original Love, which we have to good in general or happiness, upon God, as being the true and only cause of all that happiness, to which we so blindly and necessarily aspire.

4 The love of God therefore, to which we are obliged, includes two things, a *Desire* and an *Explicit* desire of him. And this indeed is the only Love of him to which we can be Morally obliged. For as to loving him confuse-ly, *that* we can't be obliged to, because 'tis *necessary* and unavoidable; and as to loving him with love of Benevolence or wishing well to, *that* we cannot be obliged to because 'tis *unpracticable*; The former we cannot be obliged to, because of the condition of *our own* Nature, and the latter we cannot be obliged to, because of the Nature of God.

I know very well that I am singular in this Point, and that nothing is more common, among those that treat of the love of God, than to talk of it as of a love of *Benevolence*, and accordingly they alwaies expresse our Love to God, and our Love to our Neighbour under the same common Appellation of *Charity*, as if they were both one and the same love, whereby we love God, and whereby we love our Neighbour. But there is I remember an old Rule, that *we may talk with the Many, but must think with the Few*, and I think tis very applicable in this case. For however we may use the word *Charity* in respect of God, to comply with popular modes of speaking, yet I cannot see how in strictness and propriety of Notion God may be lov'd with Love of *Benevolence*. For certainly as Indigence in the *Lover* is the ground of *his* loving with love of Concupiscence, so Indigence in the Person *lov'd* is the ground of our loving him with love of

of Benevolence. But now what can we wish to God that he has not already? *My goodness extendeth not to thee, but to the Saints which are in the Earth*, sayes the Psalmist, and to speak truely we can no more love God with love of *Benevolence*, than he can love us with love of *Desire*. God is as much above *this* our Love as he is above our *understanding*, He can indeed wish well to us, but we can only *Desire* him.

6 And I observe that in Scripture our Love of God is set forth in such expressions as import not any *Benevolence* to him, but a *Desire* of him. As when the Psalmist saies, *like as the Hart desireth the Water-brooks, so longeth my Soul after thee O God*; And again; *My Soul is a thirst for God, when shall I come to appear before the Presence of God?* And again, *My Soul breaketh out for fervent Desire*. Again, *whom have I in Heaven but thee, and there is none upon Earth that I Desire in Comparison of thee*. And so again

gain in the Canticles which expresse the very Soul and Spirit of Divine Love, saies the inamour'd Spouse, the Church,
 1. 2. *Let him kiss me with the kisses of his Mouth, for thy love is better than Wine.* Again, *Tell me O thou whom my*
 1. 7. *Soul loveth, where thou feedest.* But most emphatically of all, when She saies, *I charge you O Daughters of Jeru-*
 5. 8. *salem, if ye find my Beloved, tell him, that I am sick of Love.* Thus again the Angel expresses the Seraphic temper of Daniel, by calling him *A man of*
 Dan. 10. *Desires*; For so the Hebrew Criticks chuse to read it. I shall mention but one place more, and that is in the 2 of *Tim.* where the Apostle describing a sort of wicked men, saies of them, that they are *φιλήδονοι μάλλον ἢ φιλόθεοι*, *Lovers of Pleasure more than Lovers of God.* Which plainly intimates that our Love of God is of the same sort with that love wherewith we love *Pleasure*; But now we don't love Pleasure with Love of *Benevolence*, but only with Love of *De-*
sire,

sire, and consequently *that* is the Love wherewith we love God.

7 If it be here objected that though there be no room for wishing well to God *Formally* and *Directly*, yet we may rejoyce and take a *Complacency* in those Perfections of his, which make him incapable of our more exprels Benevolence, which will amount (as was urged before) to an *implicit* and *vertual* willing them to him, I answer, that what we rejoyce at we do implicitly will, if it be in a Being who either might not have had that Happiness, or holds it precariously and may hereafter be deprived of it, For here is still some *Indigence* in the Person to make him capable of our good wishes ; But now the *Happiness* of God is as necessary as his *Existence*, and consequently however we may rejoyce in his being Happy, we can no more *will* him to be *Happy*, than we can will him to *exist*. For to will him to be happy necessarily supposes, that he has not the perfect

fect Possession of that Happiness which we will him, for if he has, why do we yet will it to him? Here therefore is no room for Benevolence. Nay I do not conceive how we can wish well to God so much as *ex Hypothesi*, on supposition that he were not happy in that respect wherein we would wish well to him. For the Supposition is impossible, and takes away the very *Subject* of our Benevolence. For if God were not completely Happy, he would not be what he is, but some other Being.

8 I would by no means straiten or retrench our Love to God, but am rather for enlarging and multiplying its Channells as much as may be, and therefore if any think that God may be lov'd with Love of Benevolence, Let them *enjoy* and (if they can) *act* according to their Notion. For my part I cannot bring my self to any clear conception of it, and I am very scrupulous in venturing upon any thing
whereof

whereof I have no distinct Idea. Which ought to be Apology sufficient for me, if I make *Love of Desire* to be the only Love, wherewith we are obliged to love God.

9 And that we are obliged thus to love him, I shall briefly make out from the consideration of *our own Nature*, and from the Nature of *God*. As to our own Nature, I consider that our Thirst after good or Happiness in general is so natural, so necessary, and so vehement, that as at present we can neither *suspend*, nor *moderate*, nor in the least *interrupt* it, so we can never expect fully to *quench* or extinguish it, but in the enjoyment of that Object, which has all that happiness in it, on which the whole Bent of our Soul is so strongly set.

10 From the strength and invincible necessity of this our Inclination to good in general, I conceive 'twill follow that 'tis highly Reasonable, that that Being wherein is all this happiness

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ness

ness, to which we *indefinitely* are inclined, ought to be lov'd and desired *expressly* by us, and not only so, but with the very same love wherewith we love happiness it self. For otherwise we should contradict our first and grand Appetite, and act against the very Frame and Constitution of our Nature.

II This admitted, I consider secondly that God is that Full and rich Being, that has all this happiness in him. He is not only the *Cause* of all good, but the very *Essence* and *Nature* of it. He is (as the Divine Philosopher styles him) *Αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἐραστόν καὶ ἐφετόν* *good it self, Lovely it self, and Desirable it self.* He is indeed the *First Desirable* as well as the *First Intelligible*, and as we see and understand all things in him, so in him we desire all that we desire. In short, he is the Complement and perfection of good, the End and the Centre of the whole Intelligent Creation, and all that we can desire or enjoy ;

enjoy ; and consequently as we cannot Love *beyond* him, so we ought not to love *short of him*. St. Austin has words to this purpose worth Citing. *Summa Bonorum Deus. Neque infra remanendum nobis est, neque ultra quærendum. Alterum enim periculosum, alterum nulum est.* God is the Sum of all good. We are neither to fix on this side of him, nor to seek any thing beyond him, the former is dangerous, and the latter is nothing. Lib. De
Mor. Eccl.

12 And as we are obliged to love God, so ought we to love him beyond all other things whatsoever. We cannot indeed love him as he is *lovely* at all, nor can we love him to *our* utmost till we shall see him as he is, but we may & must now *prefer* him in our love. *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, with all thy Soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength;* so runs the Commandment. And very just we should. For if even in Particular goods Order requires that the most lovely should be

F 2

loved

loved most, much more ought we to love him who is the very *Essence* of good, *good it self*, beyond all *Derivative* and *secondary* good. For there is here no Proportion or Comparison at all.

13 And for the same cause we can never love God *too much*. As moderation has here no *excellence*, so excess has here no *place*. An Infinite Desirable can never be too much desired. God is the Measure of all Love, every thing being lovely only so far as it participates of him, and consequently the Measure of loving him is to love him without Measure. The Philosopher sayes well in his Politics, that *the Appetite of the End is alwaies without end or Term, and that bounds and stints are only in those things that are in order to the End*. God therefore being our End we can never love him to excess, no nor the Angels in Heaven neither. Indeed the thing is *Absolutely* as well as *Relatively* impossible, for as the *Narrowness* of our Nature

Nature will hinder us from loving him *enough*, so the infinite *Fulness* of his *own* makes him uncapable of being lov'd *too much*.

14. And thus much for the Love of God. The next thing that we are to desire is the good of the Community. This next to God is the greatest possible good. For 'tis the good of the *whole*, than which nothing can be greater. The good of the Community is the End, the Measure, the Accomplishment and the final result of all private goods. Hither they all point, and here they all conspire and centre. And consequently this is the greatest Beauty, the greatest Order, and the greatest Harmony that can possibly result from the *Creature*, and is the very next Resemblance of the Perfection of God, who is *all in all*.

15 This therefore being the greatest Delectable good in *it self*, it ought to be so also *to us*, who are to love and desire this good of the Community beyond

yond all private good' whatsoever. Nay we ought to desire private good no further than as 'tis conducive to, or at least consistent with the Public Interest. For I consider Society as a Musical Instrument, consisting of variety of strings of different sizes, and strain'd up to different pitches, some of whose Sounds, though ungrateful in some junctures, are yet Musical as they stand in relation to others, and in order to a Common design. Now tho' 'tis Natural to desire the grateful sound of every string singly, were this equally conducing to the harmony of the whole, yet certainly no body is so unreasonably absurd, as to desire that this or that Discord should be turned into a sound singly more grateful, to the prejudice of the general harmony, which is of infinitely greater Consequence, than the single gratefulness of one or two Particular Strings.

16 And this is the Case of us men in Society, and this ought to be our measure.

sure. We ought to consider our selves as so many strings of one great Instrument, and not affect any *Pitch* or *De-gree* more grateful to our selves, to the prejudice of the common harmony, the good of the Community, which is the most *delectable* good, and ought by us to be most Cordially tender'd, and Principally regarded. Especially considering that this is the good which God himself chiefly proposes, and principally regards both in the *Creation* and *goverment* of the universe.

17 And now since the Desire of the End necessarily includes the Desire of the Means, the next Object of our Desire must be all things which have a Natural Connexion with the good of the Community. And here 'tis supposed in the first place, that there are some things that have this Natural connexion with it. And 'tis necessary so to suppose. For as God cannot make a natural World according to any particular system whatsoever, but there
will

will necessarily arise upon it some certain Relations and habitudes of agreement and disagreement; some Motions will naturally make *for* its order and Perfection, and some *against* it. So is it impossible for God to make an Intellectual word, that is, to constitute Society in any particular condition, Scheme or posture, but Relations of agreeable and disagreeable will naturally and necessarily arise; some things will naturally make for its order and convenience, and some things will be as naturally contrary to it. And this without any arbitrary interposition of God by the mere natural result and necessity of things. For to recur again to the instance of a Musical Instrument, let an Instrument be so and so made, so and so strung, and so and so tuned, and some certain strokes upon it will necessarily be harmonical, and other some as necessarily disharmonical. But now let the Instrument be tuned another way, and the Relations

tions of convenience and disconvenience will alter, the same strokes, that were before disharmonical, may be now harmonical, and so on the contrary. But yet still some strokes will be naturally agreeable and some disagreeable, let the Instrument be set which way you please. The Application of this to Society is too obvious to insist upon.

18 To proceed therefore, it being supposed that there are some things, which have a natural connexion with the good of the Community, the next obligation of our Love will be, that whatsoever has this natural connexion be will'd and desired by us. For as the good of the Community is the greatest *Delectable* good, so that which has a natural Connexion with it is the greatest *Proffitable* good, and is therefore to be lov'd with the same love wherewith we love the good of the Community it self, wherein is also implied that whatever has an opposite Relation

Relation is in the same manner to be hated and abhorred. For this is the *general Reason* of Moral good and Evil, of Vertue and Vice, and the *Prime Fundamental Law* of Nature, which never can cease or expire, however the Particular Instances may change according to the variation of the *Intellectual Systeme*: As I have more fully Consid. upon the Nature of Sin. shewn in another Discourse, and shall therefore here no further enlarge upon it.

19. And now because with relation to the present posture of the Intellectual world, there are some particular things in Specie, which have this natural connexion with the interest of the Community, such as Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, Patience, Humility, Veracity, Fidelity and the like; hence it comes to pass that these are to be lov'd and will'd by us, by vertue of that general Canon, that whatever naturally serve to the good of the Community is to be loved, to which these are reduced

reduced as special Instances and exemplifications.

20 But I do not think my self obliged to descend to a *particular* prosecution of these or any other virtues, it being not my design to insist upon *Particulars*; but only to lay down such *general Principles*, upon which a more Particular Scheme of Morality may be erected, or into which those Particular Morals which are already extant may and ought to be resolv'd. And besides having brought the Reader into the *Road*, I think I may now be excused from attending him any further, and shall therefore advance to some other Theories of more remote and uncommon observation.

21 Having therefore fix'd the general Bounds of *Duty* by shewing what we *must* desire, I proceed to consider the Bounds of *Liberty* by shewing what we *may* desire. Now the Measures of this are either *General* or *Particular*. The general Measures are two. The First

First is, that we *may* desire any thing that is not contrary to what we *must* desire. From this arises the second general Measure, which is that we *may* desire any thing that is not contrary or Prejudicial to the *good of Society*.

22 Now as to the Particular Measures; there is too much variety in them to be all minutely and punctually consider'd. And besides it would be a *needless* as well as a *tedious* undertaking. I shall therefore only touch upon the more considerable Instances, and such as have not been made the subject of ordinary speculation. And the first Instance of our Liberty which I shall consider, is that we *may* desire *Pleasure*. First because the Desire of it is *Necessary* and *invincible*, implanted in us by the Author of our Nature, and which we can no more devert our selves of, than we can of any the most essential part of our constitution. 2ly Because pleasure as such in the common Nature of it is singly and simply good,
and

and in no respect or combination evil. It is singly and simply good, because convenient and agreeable, and in no respect or combination evil, because *as such* not against the good of the Community.

23 For if pleasure *as such* were against the good of the Community, then *every Particular* pleasure would be so, because every particular Pleasure partakes of the common nature of pleasure, which would then be enough to render it evil, the least defect being a sufficient reason to make any thing so. But now this is so far from being true, that not only some Pleasures are laudable and excellent, but on the contrary no particular pleasure is evil so far as *Pleasure*, but only by reason of some accidental Combinations and Circumstances, wherein some higher Interest is opposed by it. Now this is so far from making against Pleasure, that it makes strongly for it. For if the enjoyment of particular pleasures be
then

then only and in such Instances and Circumstances restrain'd, when the interest of some greater Happiness is thereby cross'd, it follows that pleasure it self is a thing principally regarded and provided for by God; and consequently that it is good in it self, and therefore *may* be desired by us.

24 So much as to the Desire of Pleasure in general, or as such. Now concerning Particular Pleasures I propose these *two general Canons*, which I think will hold in all Instances whatsoever. First that that Pleasure which has no trouble or pain annex'd, may, nay indeed cannot but be embraced; as on the contrary, that Pain which has no Pleasure annex'd is to be avoided. The other Canon is, that that pleasure which either hinders a greater pleasure, or causes a greater pain is to be nill'd and avoided, as on the contrary that pain which either takes off a greater Pain, or causes a greater pleasure is to be will'd and embraced. By these

these two general Canons we are to regulate our desire of particular pleasures.

25 But now of Particular Pleasures, some are Intellectual and some are Sensual. As to Intellectual Pleasures there is no question to be made, but that any of them may be desired as to their kind, only there are some Measures to be observ'd with reference to their Degree, Time, Place, and other Circumstances which are too numerous to define, and withal too obvious to need it, and may therefore be left to the Discretion of common Prudence to determine according to the two preceding general *Canons*.

26 But now concerning sensual pleasure, especially that eminent Species of it which we call *Venereal*, there is more difficulty. Of this it may be doubted whether it be in its self Evil or no. Some we know among the Ancients have expressly thought so, and upon this ground have condemn'd the use

use of Marriage, as namely, the Sect of the *Essenes* among the Jews, *Tatianus*, *Marcion*, *Manichæus* and others. And though these were censured as *Hereticks*, yet nothing more common even among Orthodox and approv'd Writers, than to let fall such expressions, from which the same conclusion will follow. For when they tax the immorality of some particular instances of Sensual Pleasure (suppose Adultery or Fornication) they don't ground their charge wholly upon those Civil inconveniences, which either of them bring upon Society in their respective Circumstances, but resolve part of their immorality into sensuality as such, abstracted from those other ill Consequences. They condemn them not only as unjust, as injurious, as inconvenient to the Public, &c. but also as *Sensual*: Now if any particular sensual pleasure be evil as *sensual*, then 'twill unavoidably follow that sensual pleasure *as such* is evil.

27 And that it is so, a man might be further induced to think, when he observes that in the Divine Writings (not to say any thing of our Common way of Discourse) such peculiar Epithets of Infamy are given to certain Instances of sensual Pleasure, which can belong to them on no other score than as *sensual*. Nay and as if here lay the very *Point* of the Immorality, they often receive a Denomination from the Sensual Pleasure, but never from the injustice, unfaithfulness or the like. Thus is Adultery call'd the sin of *Uncleanness*. And Adulterers are common call'd *unclean* Persons, *Filthy*, *brutish*, &c. In like manner David in his Penitentials for that sin insists chiefly upon the *sensual part* of it, and accordingly speaks of *washing*, *cleansing*, and *making clean*. From all which a man would be tempted to gather that the Moral illness of Adultery were at least *partly* to be resolv'd into the *sensuality* of it, and consequently that

G sensual

sensual pleasure is in it self or as such evil.

28 And this seems yet more probable from the consideration of a certain Instance of Sensual Pleasure, wherein there seems to be nothing besides the mere sensuality. As namely *voluntary Pollution*. And yet this is universally condemn'd as immoral, and consequently sensual pleasure seems to be in it self evil.

29. As it does yet further from those sharp invectives, which the Moral writers of all ages have ever used against it as a low, base, brutish and dishonorable thing, and from that *Shame* which naturally attends it, even in 'Circumstances professedly lawful, whereby men seem naturally conscious of some *Moral incongruity* in the thing purely as such.

30 But now to all this I need oppose but these two things. First that if sensual pleasure were evil in it self or as such, it would be so in all its Instances.

This

This is an undeniable Consequence. But now that it is not so in all its Instances, is plain from the Divine Institution of Marriage. And therefore it is not evil in its self. For it must not be thought (as some seem to fancy) that Marriage makes that good which was in it self evil. For if once evil in it self, it must eternally and universally be so, and consequently even in Marriage it self, *that* as to *Sensual Pleasure* being the same with *Fornication* or *Adultery*. But sensual pleasure is not evil in *Marriage*, therefore not in *it self* or as such. This is *Demonstration*.

31 To this I further add that even the grossest Pleasure of Sense, is one of the remoter Participations of God. For it must be granted to be at least a *Natural good*, and every particular good be it what it will, is a Ray and Emanation of the universal good. But now nothing of God can be *simply* and *absolutely* evil. And besides, I consider

that in the Human frame God has prepared Organs and Instruments for the use of Sensual Pleasure, and that he has also given us Natural Appetites and Inclinations to it. Whereby it appears that God has provided for the gratification of the *Animal* as well as the *Divine* life. And though this is to be chiefly nourish'd, yet the other is not to be starv'd. For it is a Tree of Gods own planting, and therefore the Fruit of it may be good for Food, as well as Fair to the eye. For there can be nothing simply evil in the *Paradise of God*. As tis finely made out by the excellent *Doctor More* in several places of his *Conjectura Cabalistica*, where the Reader may find this Argument copiously and very excellently managed.

32 I conclude therefore that Sensual Pleasure is not in its own simple Nature evil, and Consequently that no Particular Instance of it is evil barely as being *Sensual* (for if so then sensual pleasure as such would be evil) but
only

only as it stands invested with some Circumstances, which make it inconsistent with some higher good, the good of society. Thus in voluntary Pollution there is a *deordination* from the End of Nature, *Generation*, and herein consists its evil, not in its being a *sensual pleasure*. And accordingly we find that those other *Pleasures* of sense, which are not appropriated by Nature to any peculiar end, are in their use wholly indifferent, as using rich Perfumes, drinking delicious Wines, &c. Thus again in Fornication, though the end of *generation* may be here serv'd, yet the ends of *Convenient Education* cannot. And herein lies the evil of this, not in its being an act of sensuality or a sensual Pleasure.

33 But because there are some that are ready to call in question the *natural immorality* of simple Fornication, and those that do allow it are scarce resolv'd where to fix it, 'twill not be amiss to prosecute this a little further.

The best Account that I know of this matter, is that which is given by *Tho. Aquinas*, and indeed I think it very Full, rational and satisfactory. And because I cannot do it in better words, I will give it in his own. *It is to be consider'd (sayes he) that in those Animals, in which the Female alone is sufficient for the bringing up of the young, the Male and Female after Copulation remain no time together, as in Dogs. But among those Animals in which the Female is not sufficient for the bringing up of the young, the Male and Female after Copulation remain together, as long as is necessary for the Education and Instruction of the young. As it appears in some Birds, whose young ones can't get their living presently after they are brought forth. For since Birds don't nourish their young with milk (which Nature has made ready at hand, as in Beasts) but are forc'd to go forrage abroad for Meat, and besides to cherish their young while they feed them, the Female*

Lib. 3. con.
gent. cap.
122.

male would not be sufficient alone for all this. And therefore by the order of Providence the Male among such Creatures is Naturally inclined to abide with the Female for the Education of the young. Now 'tis plain that in Human kind the Woman would by no means suffice alone for the Education of the Child, since the necessity of Human life requires many things which cannot be supplied by one only. It is therefore convenient according to Human Nature that the Man after Conjunction should abide by the Woman, and not presently depart, and take up indifferently with any body, as 'tis among those that Fornicate. Neither will the case be alter'd by the womans being so rich as to be able to nourish her child by her self. Because the Natural Rectitude of Human actions is not to be measured according to those things, which happen by Accident in one Individual, but according to those things which follow the whole Species. Again it is to be consider'd, that in Human kind the Offspring

Spring does not only need nourishment as to the body, like other Animals, but also Instruction as to the Soul. For other Animals have Natural Instincts by which they may provide for themselves. But now man lives by Reason, and must attain to discretion by long experience. Whence it becomes necessary that Children be instructed by their experienc'd Parents. Nor are they capable of this Instruction as soon as they are born, but after a considerable time, and chiefly when they come to years of Discretion. For to this Instruction a great deal of time is required, and even then too by reason of the violence of Passion by which the Judgment is perverted, they will want not only to be instructed, but to be subdued. Now for this the Woman alone is not sufficient, but this is rather to be the work of the Man, whose Reason is better able to instruct, and his strength to Correct. 'Tis necessary therefore in Human kind to take care of the Off-spring not for a short time as in Birds, but for a considerable

*vable space of life. And therefore where-
as tis necessary in all Creatures that the
Male abide with the Female as long as
the Office of the Male is requisite for the
Off-spring, tis natural to mankind that
the Man associate not for a little while
but alwaies with one determinate wo-
man. And this Society we call Matri-
mony. Matrimony is therefore natural
to mankind. And Fornicarious mixture,
which is besides Matrimony, is against the
good of Man, and for this reason must of
necessity be a sin.*

34 Thus this excellent and most ex-
act Theorist, whose words I should not
have transcribed at length, were they
not of more than ordinary weight
and moment. By this it appears, that
Simple Fornication is naturally im-
moral, and wherein its Immorality
lies. Not in its being a Sensual Plea-
sure, but in its being so circumstan-
tiated as not to comport with the good
of society. And what I observe here
in particular of simple Fornication, the
same

same may be said of any other forbidden Instance of Sensual Pleasure, that they are not evil as sensual, but upon the Consideration of some Accident or Circumstance, whereby they interfere with the Publick interest.

35 To the Objections therefore on the other side I answer, first that it must be own'd that nothing is more common, even among approv'd Writers, than when they tax the immorality of some particular Instances of sensual pleasure to condemn them under the Formality of their being sensual. But herein is their *mistake*, and if men will talk confusedly of things, and assign *false* causes for *true* ones, who can help it?

36 To the second I answer, that when the Scripture gives such peculiar Epithetes of Infamy to some instances of sensual pleasure, that can belong to them on no other score than as sensual, it must be confess'd that the sensual part is then tax'd. But then this
is

is not, must not be understood as to the *kind*, but as to the *Degree*. Not the degree of *Pleasure*, but the degree of *Affection*, it being a plain Argument, that men are too much *set* upon Sensual Pleasure, when for the sake of it they will adventure to transgress *Order*, and trespass against the *good* of *Society*. And this indeed is a *culpable sensuality*.

37 To the third I answer, that in that certain condemn'd Instance of sensual pleasure wherein there seems to be nothing besides the mere sensual perception, there is really something besides, tho not according to a *Physical*, yet according to a *Moral Estimation*. For it is not barely a sensual pleasure, but a sensual pleasure *deordinated* from the end of *God and Nature*, namely, *generation*, for which it was design'd. And in this *Deordination* not in the *sensuality* consists its natural evil and Moral Turpitude.

38 To the fourth I answer that those
severe

severe declamations which the Moralists of all Ages have made against sensual pleasure in general, as a low, base, brutish and dishonourable thing, must either be understood *Comparatively*, with respect to the higher character of Intellectual Pleasures, or they are *ill grounded* and *unreasonable*. And then as to the *shame*, which naturally attends the acting of this sensual pleasure in all its instances, though it may in the first place be question'd whether this shame be from *Nature* or no, and not rather from *Education* and *Arbitrary usages*, yet for the present I will suppose it natural, and the Account of it I conceive must be this, it being a thing of vast consequence and Moment to the interest of Sociable life, that man should be propagated in a decent and regular way, and not as Brutes are, God thought it convenient for this purpose to imbue our Natures with this impression of shame with respect to venereal pleasure *in general*. Not because

cause this sensual delectation is in its own nature simply evil, but lest our Inclination to sensual pleasure *in general* should betray us into *those instances* of it which are so. Which this natural impression was intended as a curb to prevent. By all which it plainly appears notwithstanding all the intricacy, wherewith some confused Thinkers have entangled this matter, that Sensual, even the grossest sensual pleasure cannot be in its own nature and as such evil, and consequently that it *may* be desired by us in such convenient Circumstances, wherein no higher good is opposed.

39 Now from this Hypothesis it will follow first, that *Original Concupiscence* must be far otherwise stated than usually it is. It is commonly understood to be a vicious disposition or Depravation of Nature, whereby we become inclined to *evil*. Now if you ask, what evil. They tell you, tis Carnal or sensual pleasure. But now (as it has been abundantly

abundantly demonstrated) this is not *simply* and in its own nature evil, but only as 'tis *Circumstantiated*. And this original Concupiscence is not so particular (as being a blind Appetite) as to point to sensual pleasure in this or that *Circumstance*, but is carried only to sensual pleasure in *common* or *as such*. Which being not evil, neither can the inclination that respects it be evil or sinful, every Act or Inclination being specified from its *Object*. It must not be said therefore, that this Ordinary Concupiscence, or natural Impression toward sensible good, is *formally evil and sinful*, the most we can allow is, that it is an *Occasion* of evil, the strong tendency we have to sensual pleasure in *common*, being very apt to betray us to consent to the enjoyment of it in *inconvenient Instances* and *Circumstances*.

40 Another Consequent from the Premises is this, that the Duty and virtue of Mortification does not consist
(as

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(as 'tis vulgarly apprehended) in removing and killing the natural Desire of sensual pleasure. For the natural *Desire* of sensual pleasure is not evil, its *Object* not being so, and consequently not to be eradicated. But that it consists in such a due Repression and Discipline of the Body, that our *natural* desire of sensual pleasure in *Common* may not carry us to the *express* willing of it in *such instances* as are against *Order*, and the *good of Society*.

SECT.

S E C T. III.

*The Measures of Love of Benevolence,
particularly of Self-love.*

1 **H**AVING prescribed some general Measures for the Regulation of the first great Branch of Love, Love of *Concupiscence*, I come now to set bounds to the other *Arm* of the same great *Sea*, Love of *Benevolence*. And because this is first divided into *Self-love* and *Charity*, or wishing well to *oneself*, and wishing well to some *other* Being, I shall in the first place state the Measures of regulating *self-love*.

2 This sort of Love is generally the most irregular of any, and that which causes irregularity in all the rest. We love our selves *First*, and *last*, and *most* of all. Here we alwaies *begin*, and here we most commonly *end*, and so immoderate are we in it that we prosecute

cute our own private interest, not only without any respect to the Common good, but oftentimes in direct Opposition to it, and so we can but secure to our selves a *Plank*, care not what becomes of the Vessel we sail in. This is the great *Sucker* of Society, and that which robs the Body Politick of its due nourishment, and drains the Common Fountain to feed our own lesser Streams. Nay so foolishly immoderate and inordinate are we in the love of our selves, that we prefer our own little interests not only before greater of the *Public*, but before greater of our *own*, and love our Bodies better than our Souls, a lesser interest that's present better than a greater that's distant, tho equally sure, and infinitely greater. In short, tis from the inordinateness of this one Principle, Self-love, that we ruin the good of the Community here, and our own selves both here and hereafter. Here therefore is great need of Regulation.

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3 Now

3 Now I suppose the Measures of Self-love may all be reduced to this one in general, viz. *that self-love is never culpable, when upon the whole matter all things being taken into the Account, we do truly and really love our selves.* It is then only culpable, when we love our selves by *halves*, and in some particular respects only to our greater disadvantage in others of more importance. And because this we generally do, hence it comes to pass that *self-love* is commonly taken in a bad sense, as if 'twere a thing evil and irregular in it self. But that's a mistake, Self-love is a Principle and Dictate of Nature, and the Instrument of attaining to that Happiness, which is the End of our Creation, and consequently can never be faulty, when upon the whole matter all things consider'd, it is a *true* Love of our selves,

4 Now to make it so, three things are required. First that we do not mistake our *true selves* by wishing well to

to, or consulting the welfare of our worser part in prejudice to our better, by feeding the *Brute* and starving the *Man*. This would be to love our selves in a little, and to hate our selves in much, and would therefore upon the whole, better deserve the name of *self-hatred* than *self-love*. It therefore we would love our selves truly and regularly, we must learn in the first place not to mistake our *true selves*.

5 The next requisite is, that we do not mistake our *true Interest*, by willing to our selves a lesser good, when the having it will cost us the loss of a greater. This is properly that *Foolish Exchange* condemn'd by our B. Saviour; 'Tis to gain a *World*, and loose a *Soul*; and what gain's that? This is indeed the Bargain of Fools and Madmen, and yet such Bargains we usually make, and what adds to the folly, think that we *love* our *selves* all the while. But this is not to love our selves *truly*, and therefore not *Regularly*.

6 The third and last Requisite for the Regulation of self-love is, that we do not will any good to our selves, that is not consistent with the good of the *Community*. And that not only because the Publick good is of greater Consequence than any Private good can be, but also because that which is against the good of the Community, cannot be upon a final Consideration of things really for the good of any Particular Person in it. For the good of the *whole* is the good of the *Part*, and the evil of the whole is the evil of the Part, and all private Interest is so twisted, complicated and imbarqued with the Publick, that there is no prejudicing this without prejudicing that. This indeed may not be the present and immediate effect, but 'twill prove so in the consequence and final upshot. For Society is like an *Arch* in a Building, where one Stone supports another, and in supporting others they support themselves. And so on the contrary,

contrary, should they undermine one another, they would at length by consequence undermine themselves. He therefore that out of love to himself prosecutes any private interest to the Prejudice of Society, trespasses against his own good as well as that of the Community, and when all is computed, cannot be said truly and really to love *himself*. The Sum is, to make our self-love Regular and according to Order, we must take care not to mistake our *true selves*, nor our *true Interest*, and that we don't prejudice the *Publick* welfare, and then we can never love our selves too much.

S E C T. IV.

The Measures of Common Charity.

1 **C**ONCERNING *Common Charity*. I consider that the Measures of it may all briefly be absolv'd in these two, the *Object* of it, and the *Order* of it. As to the *Object* of Charity, 'tis of a very great and diffused latitude, and takes in first *all men*, whether good or bad, Friends or Enemies, Neighbours or Strangers, and in all Respects, whether as to Soul or Body, name or goods &c. It extends also in some Measure to the very *Irrational Creatures*, it being one of the Characters of a good man in Scripture to be Merciful to his Beast. Nay it reaches to the *Angelical Natures* themselves, and indeed to the whole Intellectual, Rational and Sensitive world that are capable of the least degree of Benefit.

2 In all this there is no Difficulty,
only

only it may be here question'd, whether the Devils and Damn'd Spirits are to be comprehended within the Sphere of our Charity? To which I answer, that there are two things that may render any Being incapable of being an Object of our Charity or wishing well to. Either *Perfect Fulness*, or *Perfect Indigence*. Now 'tis the *Perfection* of Indigence to be reduced to such a Degree of want as not to be in a *Capacity* of ever being releiv'd. The former is the Condition of *God*, which makes him incapable of being made the object of our Benevolence, as was observ'd before, the latter is the case of *Devils* and *Damn'd Spirits*: And for this reason we cannot will any good to them, as not being capable of any. For we cannot exert any act of Love which we know to be in vain and to no purpose at all, let the incapacity proceed either from extream Fulness or extream Indigence; for what is there that should excite any such Act? And besides

sides if we could possibly wish well to such Beings, yet I don't see how we may do it *lawfully* and *Regularly*. For our will would not be then conformable to Gods, but directly opposite to it, and besides we should disapprove, at least tacitly and interpretatively, the *Justice* of his waies, by thus loving them whom he *extremely* hates, and Blessing them whom he curses and abandons for ever.

3 Thus far of the *Object* of our Charity. Now concerning the *Order* of it, let these general Measures be observ'd. First that we wish well to him most, who is most likely to be serviceable to the Publick, supposing the good which we will him, to be such, as by the having it, he become more capable of serving the Publick. Thus had I the Disposal of an *Ecclesiastical Benefice*, which is a thing wherein the good of the Publick is highly concern'd, I ought certainly to bestow it upon him who I thought would do most good in it. Tho

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at the same time I had never so many Friends or Relations that wanted it. For this is a sure and never failing Rule, that the good of the Publick is alwaies to be prefer'd before any Private interest whatever.

4 Secondly that of two that are equally serviceable to the Publick, we will this good wherein the Publick is concern'd, to him that is most *Indigent*; for after the Publick exigence is provided for, private necessity comes in to be regarded. But if both equally *serviceable* and equally *Indigent*, then we are to will it to him that is most our Neighbour, Friend, or Relation, or any other way indear'd to our Affection.

5 But thirdly, supposing the good to be such that the Interest of the Public is not concern'd who has it, then I am only to consult the good of the *Person* to whom I will it, and consequently here Equity will require that the Preference be given to those that are near
me

me before strangers, and among those that are near to those that are nearest, whether by Nature, Choice, or Place, or in any other Respect. And among strangers 'tis equitable that the Indigent be prefer'd in our Charity before the Rich, the good before the Bad, and the more good before the less good, and the like. But still with this necessary Reserve, that all other things be equal between them.

6 For 4ly, 'tis utterly unreasonable, that I should prefer the *Convenience* of my *Friend* before the *Necessity* of my *Enemy*. No, I ought to do the contrary, and prefer the *Necessity* of my *worst* enemy before the *Convenience* even of my *Dearest* Friend. Thus I would leave my Friend in the Mire, to save my enemy from drowning. For in this and such like cases the greatness of the *Necessity* compensates for the *want* of *merit* in the Person.

7 The last general Measure that I shall prescribe is, that as we ought not
to

to prefer any man's convenience before *another* man's necessity, so neither ought we to prefer any man's own convenience before his *own* necessity. My meaning is, that we ought to consider our Neighbours true and best Interest, will and do him that good which he stands most in need of, and not do him a little kindness which will end in a greater mischief. Hence it follows that we ought to tender the Interest of his Soul, more than the good of his Body; the *Direction* of his conscience more than the *ease* and *security* of it; that we stick not to *prick* and *launce* him in order to his *Cure*; and (when both can't be done) that we chuse rather to *proffit* him than to *please* him. For this is *true* Charity, tho a *severer* sort of it, and he is a Fool, who when saved from drowning, complains of being pluckt out of the water by the hair of his head.

S E C T.

S E C T. V.

The Measures of Friendship.

I **I** Am now come to my last Stage, where I am to give Measures to the greatest *Rarity*, and the greatest *Excellency* in all the world. *For indeed among all Human enjoyments nothing is so Rarely acquired, so Dearly possess'd, and so unhappily lost as a True Friend.*

2 Indeed true Friendship is so great a *Rarity*, that I once thought it hardly worth while, to prescribe Measures to a thing that so *seldom* happens, and when it does, those few excellent Persons, that are fit for so Sacred a union, can never want to be instructed how to conduct it. But then considering withal the great excellency, and usefulness of it to human life, I could not forgive my self so considerable an Omission, as the passing by the Regulation

tion of so noble a Charity.

3 I call it *Charity*, for 'tis a special Modification of it, and differs no otherwise from common Charity, than as 'tis qualify'd by some particular Modifications and Circumstances, as was above described. It is a *Sacred Inclosure* of that Benevolence, which we owe to all Mankind in *Common*, and an *Actual* exercise of that kindness to a *few*, which we would willingly shew to all, were it practicable and consistent with our *Faculties*, *Opportunities*, and *Circumstances*. 'Tis indeed a kind of *Revenging* our selves upon the *Narrowness* of our Faculties, by exemplifying that extraordinary Charity upon one or two which we both owe, and are also *ready* and disposed, but by reason of the scantiness of our condition, are not sufficiently *able* to exercise towards all. We are willing that even *this* our love should be as extensive and diffused as the Light, (as for *Common Charity*, that must and ought to be so) but
then

then finding that the Rayes of it would be too faint and weak, to give any body any considerable warmth, when so widely spread and diffused, we are fain to contract them into a little compass to make them burn and heat, and then our *Charity* Commences *Friendship*.

4 Now as to the Measures of Friendship, these have been already so amply and excellently stated by the Seraphic Pen of a great Prelate of our Church, in a just Discourse upon this Occasion, that there needs nothing to be further added; nor should I offer to write an *Iliad* after such an *Homer*, did I not think it more necessary to the Intireness of this work in *general*, than to make up any defect in this *Particular* Part, which that excellent Author has not supplied. I shall therefore be the more brief and sparing in this Account.

5 Now I suppose all that is necessary for the Regulation of Friendship may conveniently be reduced to these
three

three general considerations. First what Measures are to be observed in the Contracting of Friendship. 2ly What Measures are to be observ'd in the conducting or maintaining it. 3ly What Measures are to be observ'd in the dissolving of it.

6 In the contracting of Friendship our first care must be to make such a choice as we shall never have cause to *repent* of. For when ever we cease to *love* a Friend, 'tis great odds if we do not *mortally hate* him. For 'tis hard to maintain a *Mediocrity* ; and nothing can reflect more upon our Prudence and Discretion, than to *hate* him whom we once thought worthy of our *highest* love.

7 Now that we may not repent of our Choice, the Measures to be observ'd are these. First, that the Person whom we mark out for a Friend, be a *good* and *vertuous* Man. For an ill man can neither long *love*, nor be long *belov'd*. Not by a *good* man to be sure,
nor

nor indeed by one as *bad* as *himself*. For this is a true Observation, that however men love evil in *themselves*, yet no man loves it in *another*, and tho a man may be a Friend to *Sin*, yet no body loves the *Sinner*. And accordingly we find that the Friendships of wicked men are the most *temporary* and *short-lived* things in the world, and indeed are rather to be call'd *Conspiracies* than *Friendships*. And besides their Interests will draw them several waies, and so distract and divide their union; for vice is full of *Variety* and *Contradiction*, sets one and the same man at odds with *himself*, much more with *another*. But now Virtue is a thing of *oneness*, *simplicity* and *uniformity*, and indeed the only solid Foundation for Friendship.

8 The next Measure is that we chuse a Person of a *sweet, liberal and obliging humour*. For there are a thousand little endearments and compliances in the exercise of Friendship, that make

good

good Nature as necessary as *rigid virtue* and *Honesty*. Strict virtue in Friendship is like the exact Rules of *Mathematicks* in Musical compositions, which indeed are necessary to make the Harmony *true* and *regular*, but then there must be something of *Ayre* and *Delicacy* in it too, to *sweeten* and recommend it, or else 'twill be but flat and heavy.

9 The next Measure to this purpose is that we chuse a Person of a humour and disposition as nigh our *own* as we can. This will make our friendly Communications both more *pleasant* and more *lasting*. The other qualities are as the *Materials* in Building, this answers to *Figure* and shape. And unless the Materials be of an agreeable and correspondent *figure*, though otherwise never so good, the structure will neither be sightly to the eye, nor hold long together.

10 One thing more I would have remember'd in the contracting of friendship, and that is, that we don't make

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our

our selves over to too *many*. Marriage which is the strictest of Friendships admits but of *one*, and indeed inferiour Friendship admits not of many more. For besides that the Tide of Love, by reason of the contractedness of our faculties, can't bear very high when divided among several channels, 'tis great odds but that among many we shall be deceiv'd in some, and then we must be put upon the inconvenience of *Repentance* and *retraction of choice*, which in nothing is so uncomely and inconvenient as in *friendship*. Be kind therefore to *all*, but *Intimate* only with *a few*.

II Now the Measures of conducting and maintaining friendship may be such as these. 1. That we look upon our Friend as another self, and treat him accordingly. 2. That we love him fervently, effectually and constantly. 3. That we *use* his conversation frequently, and *alwaies* prefer it. 4. That we trust him with our Secrets and most impor-

important concerns. 5. That we make use of his help and service, and be not shy of being obliged to him. 6. That we don't easily entertain any Jealousies or Suspensions of him. 7. That we defend his Reputation when we hear it wrongfully charged. 8. That we wink at those small faults which he *really* has. 9. That we take the Freedom to *advise*, and if need be, to *reprove* him, and that we be well contented to take the same usage from him again. 10. That we freely pay him that Respect and just Acknowledgment that's due to his Merits, and that we shew our selves pleased when the same is done by others. 11. That we do not *envy* him when advanced above us, nor *despise* him when fallen beneath us. 12. That we relieve him plentifully and liberally when reduced to any streights or exigencies. And lastly, that we alwaies prefer the good of his Soul before any other interest of his, and make it our strictest concern to pro-

mote his Happy condition in the other world. This indeed is the most excellent and necessary Office of Friendship, and all without this is but of little signification.

12. And thus much for the *Conducing* of Friendship. I proceed now to the Measures that are to be observ'd in the *Dissolution* of it. And here two things come to be consider'd, the *Cause*, and the *Manner* of dissolving it. And first, 'tis suppos'd that there may be a Cause for the *Dissolution* even of *Friendship*. The wise man tells us, that for some things every Friend will depart, and Marriage, which is the strictest Frindship, has its *Divorce*. For tis with the union of two Friends, as with the union of Soul and Body. There are some degrees of distemperature that, although they weaken and disturb the union, yet however they are consistent with it, but then there are others again, that quite destroy the *Vital Congruity*, and then follows *Separation*.

13 Now as to the Cause, that may justify a Dissolution of Friendsh, it can be no other than something, that is directly contrary to the very Design and Essence of Friendship, such as a notorious Apostacy to vice and wickedness, notorious Perfidiousness, deliberate Malice or the like. To which (were I to speak my own sense) I would add, a desperate and resolv'd continuance in all this, For I think as long as there is any hopes of amendment, the man is rather to be *Advised* than *Deserted*.

14 But if hopeless and irreclaimable, we may and must desert him. But let it be with all the tenderness imaginable, with as much unwillingness and reluctancy as the Soul leaves her *overdistemper'd* Body. And now our greatest care must be that our former Dearness turn not to inveterate Hatred. There is great danger of this, but it ought not to be so. For tho the *Friend* be gone, yet still the *Man* remains, and

tho he has forgotte'd my *Friendship*, yet still I owe him *common Charity*. And 'twere well if we would rise a little higher, and even yet pay him some little respect, and maintain a small *under-current* of Affection for him, upon the stock of our former dearness and Intimacy. For so the deceased Ghost loves to hover for a while about her old Companion, though by reason of its *utter discongruity*, it be no longer fit for the *mutuall* intercourses of *Life* and *Action*.

MOTIVES TO THE STUDY
AND PRACTICE OF
REGULAR LOVE
By way of Consideration.

1. **C**ONSIDER O my Soul, that the very *Essence* of the most *Perfect* Being is *Regular Love*. The very same *Apostle* that saies *God is Love*, saies also in another place that *God is Light*, and that in him *there is no darkness at all*, Joh. 1. 5. God therefore is both *Love* and *Light*; *Light* invigorated and actuated by *Love*, and *Love* directed and regulated by *Light*. He is indeed a *Lucid* and *Bright* act of *Love*, not *Arbitrary Love*, but *Love* regulated by the exactest *Rules* and *Measures* of
Essential

Essential Perfection. For how Regular a Love must that needs be, where the same Being is both *Love* and *Light* !

2. Consider again my Soul, that the Material World the Offspring and Emanation of this *Lucid Love*, is altogether conformable to the *Principle* of its production, a perfect Sample and Pattern of Order and Regularity, of Beauty and Proportion, the very *Reflexion* of the first Pulchritude, and a most exact Copy of the *Divine Geometry*. And if thou could'st but see a draught of the *Intellectual* world, how far more Beautiful and delightfom yet would that *Orderly Prospect* be. And wilt thou my Soul, be the only Irregular and Disorderly thing among the Productions of God ? Wilt thou disturb the Harmony of the Creation, and be the only jarring String in so Composed and well-tuned an Instrument ? As thou wilt certainly be if thou dost not *Love Regularly*. For

3 Consider My Soul, that 'tis *Regular*

lar Love that makes up the Harmony of the *Intellectual* world, as *Regular Motion* does that of the *Natural*. That Regularity of the *understanding* is of no other Moment or Excellency, than as it serves to the Regulating of *Love*. That herein lies the Formal Difference between good and bad *Men* in *this* world, and between the good and bad *Spirits* in the *other*. Brightness of *understanding* is Common to both, and for ought we know, in an equal Measure, but one of these *loves Regularly* and the other does not, and therefore one we call an *Angel*, and t'other a *Devil*. For 'tis Regular Love upon which the welfare and Civil Happiness of Society depends. This is in all respects the same to the *Moral* world, as *Motion* is to the *Natural*. And as this is maintain'd in its Course by *Regularity* of *Motion*, so must the other be upheld by *Regularity* of *Love*. And therefore further.

4. Consider O my Soul, that the God of *Order*, he that is both *Light* and *Love*,
has

has prescribed two sort of Laws with respect to the two worlds, *Laws of Motion*, and *Laws of Love*. Indeed the Latter have not their Effect as *Necessarily* and determinately as the former; for the Laws of *Motion* God executes by himself, but the Laws of *Love* he has committed to the execution of his Creatures, having endow'd them with choice and Liberty. But let not this my Soul be used as an Argument to make thee less Studious of Loving Regularly, because thou art not irresistibly determin'd and necessitated to Love according to Order, but art left to thy own Choice and Liberty. Neither do thou fancy God less concern'd for the *Laws of Love*, than for the *Laws of Motion*, because he has not enforced those, with the same *Necessity* as he has these, For

5. Consider yet further My Soul, that God has taken as much care for the Regulation of Love as is consistent with the Nature of *Free Agents*. For
has

has he not prescribed Laws of Regular Love? And has he not furnish'd thee with a stock of *Natural Light* and understanding, of Reason and Discourse to discern the *Antecedent Equity* and Reasonableness of these Laws? And lest thou should'st be negligent in the use of this *Discursive Light*, has he not as a farther security of thy Regular Love against the danger either of *Ignorance* or *Inconsideration*, furnish'd thee with certain *Moral Anticipations* and *Rational Instincts*, which prevent all thy Reasonings and Discoursings about what thou oughtest to Love, and point out the great Lines of thy Duty, before thou art able, and when thou dost not attend enough to see into the Natural grounds of it. And lest all this should prove insufficient or ineffectual, has he not bound thy Duty upon thee by the most weighty *Sanctions*, and most prevailing *Engagements* of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, of *Eternal Happiness*, and *Eternal Misery*? And
to

to make all this efficacious, does he not assist thee by the Graces of his Spirit in the Regulation of thy Love? And what can God do more with the safety of his *own Wisdom*, and of *thy Liberty*? And lest thou should'st fancy that 'tis either *in vain*, or *unnecessary* to apply thy self to the Study of Regular Love,

6. Consider yet further My Soul, that the great *Mystery of godliness* is nothing else but a *Mysterious Expedient for the promotion of Regular Love*. As it proceeded from Love, so does it wholly tend to the Regulation of it. 'Twas to atone for the Irregularities of Love, that the Son of God became a Sacrifice to his Father. To atone for it so far, that all the Lapses and Misapplications of our Love should be forgiven, provided we return to the Regularity of Love for the future. Had he not done *so much*, to return to Regular Love had been *in vain*, and had he done more, it had been *Needless*.
But

But herein is the *Mystery of Godliness*, that by the wise dispensation of God the matter is so order'd, that Happiness is attainable by the *Order of Love*, and not without it. And can there be a stronger ingagement, O my Soul, to perswade thee to the Study of Regular Love, or to convince thee that God is not less concern'd for the Harmony of the *Moral*, than of the *Natural* world, for the *Order of Love*, than for the *Order of Motion*? Be wise then O my Soul, and consult the *Ends* of God, the *Harmony* of the *World*, and thy *own Eternal Happiness*. And that these thy Considerations may be the more effectual, apply thy self with all possible elevation of spirit to the God of *Light* and *Love*.

T H E

THE PRAYER.

O God of Order and Beauty, who sweetly disposest all things, and hast establish'd a Regular course in the visible World, who hast *appointed the Moon for certain Seasons*, and by whose decree the *Sun knoweth his going down*, let the Moral world be as Regular and Harmonious as the Natural, and both conspire to the declaration of thy Glory. And to this End grant that the Motion of our Minds may be as orderly as the Motion of Bodies, and that *we may move as regularly by Choice and free Election, as they do by Natural instinct and Necessity.*

O God of *Light and Love*, warm and invigorate my Light, and direct and regulate my Love. In thy Light let me see Light, and in thy Love let me ever Love. Lord I am more apt to err in my Love than in my understanding, and one Errour in Love is of worse Consequence.

Consequence than a thousand in Judgment , O do thou therefore watch over the Motions of my Love with a peculiar governance , and grant that I my self may keep this Part with all diligence, seeing hence are the *issues of Life and Death*.

O Spirit of Love, who art the very Essence , Fountain and Perfection of Love, be thou also its *Object, Rule, and Guide*. Grant I may Love *thee*, and *what* thou love'st, and *as* thou love'st. O Clarify and refine, enlighten and actuate my Love, that it may mount upward to the Center and Element of Love, with a Steddy, Chast, and unfullied Flame ; make it unselfish, universal, liberal , generous and Divine, that loving as I ought I may contribute to the Order of thy Creation here, and be perfectly Happy in loving thee, and in being lov'd by thee Eternally hereafter. *Amen.*

L E T-

*Letters Philosophical and Moral,
to D^r Henry More, with the Do-
ctor's Answers.*

Advertisment to the Reader.

THe Publication of this Correspondence was almost extorted from me by the importunity of some friends, who would not endure to think that any Remains of so great and extraordinary a Person should be lost. And truly when I consider'd, how curious and busy some men are in recovering a few broken Fragments of some old dull Author that had scarce any thing to recommend him but only, that he *lived a great while ago*, I began to think there was some force in the Argument, and that I should be unkind to the *world* as well as to the *Memory* of my *deceased Friend*, should I detain in obscurity such rich Treasures of excellent

lent Theory as are contain'd in these Letters.

To the publishing of which I was yet the less unwilling to consent, because of that near Relation which some of them have to the Matter of some part of this Book, which may receive some further Light from what is herein contain'd.

But there is more in the business yet. I had formerly in a Discourse, at first printed by it self and dedicated to the Doctor, but now inserted in my Collection of Miscellanies lately publish'd, laid down an Hypothesis concerning the *Root of Liberty*, which whether for its novelty and singularity, or because not well understood, underwent a great deal of Censure at its first appearing; And the Excellent Dr. himself was pleased to animadvert upon it; And I think has urged all that can be said against it. But I think I have sufficiently vindicated the truth of the Notion, and was therefore willing it

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should

should now appear to the world in its full strength and evidence, which could not have been more abundantly confirm'd to me, than in its being able to stand the shock of so severe a Speculatist.

Epistola prima ad Clarissimum Virum Henricum More.

Vir eximie,

QUum eruditionem tuam & Humanitatem ex scriptorum tuorum genio pari passu ambulare animadvertam, & insuper in ipso Libri tui Vestibulo te Coram profitentem audiam, *te non tibi soli laborare, sed etiam pro omnibus iis qui exquirunt sapientiam*, eoque mihi natus exolevit pudor, ut ad te (ignotum licet) Oraculi vice de quibusdam Arduis sciscitationum mitterem.

Duo igitur sunt (ut apud virum horarum quam parcissimum Compendio agam) quæ animum meum suspensum

sum tenent. In *Enchiridio tuo Metaphysico* demonstrare satagis immobile quoddam extensum à Mobili materia distinctum existere; Quod demonstrationum tuarum nervis adductus non solum Concedere paratus sum, sed etiam firmissime Credo. Illud tantum me male habet, quod dimensionem istam incorpoream (quam *spatii* nomine designare solemus) in infinitum porrigas, & undequaque immensam statuas. Hoc equidem ut admittam nondum à facultatibus meis impetrare potui. Quum enim *spatium* illud sit *Quantitas permanens*, cujus omnes partes, quotquot sunt vel esse possunt, *simul* existunt, contradictoria mihi videtur affirmare quisquis illud *infinite* extensum dixerit. Infinitum enim esse & tamen secundum omnes partes actu existere repugnant. Nam secundum omnes partes actu existere est certis limitibus claudi. Eodem modo ac quilibet numerus (quantuscunque assignetur) continetur sub certa specie numeri,

meri, proindeque finitus concludi debet. Fateor aliter se rem habere in *quantitate successiva*, cujus partes existunt aliæ post alias, quæ quoniam post quantamcunque appositionem incrementi ulterius capax est, suo modo cenferi possit infinita. Cujus vero partes omnes coexistunt (cujusmodi est *spatium*) finitum sit necesse videtur, quum partes ejus (prout etiam innuit Terminus ille inclusivus (*Omnes*) sub certam numeri speciem cadant.

Altera quam ejusdem *Enchiridii* tui lectio mihi suggerit Difficultas est de *Penetrabilitate Spiritus*. Dicis spiritus non obstante illorum extensione posse se mutuo penetrare, hoc est, idem ubi occupare. Quod tamen explicas per *sui Contractionem*, & illustras exemplo Ceræ in minus spatium convolutæ. Quod innuere videtur, te per spirituum *Penetrationem* nihil aliud intelligere, quam quod duo spiritus per situs mutationem in pressiores formam reducti, eundem illum locum occupare possint

possint quem situ non mutato unus illorum forsan impleret. Itane? Sed hæc non est Penetratio illa in scholis adeo decantata, scilicet *Coexistentia Dimensionum in eodem ubi*, sed solum *juxta positio* in eodem loco communi, quæ non minus corporibus quam spiritibus competit.

Hæc forsan à me non adeo dilucide prolata sunt, verum tuam meam quam propriæ mentis facilis esse potes Interpreter. Rogo igitur ut in tenebris hisce (modo per alia majoris momenti non stet) facem mihi accendere non graveris. Non *Oppugnatoris* sed *Quæstoris* personam gero, nec ut te incitiæ arguam hæc scribo, sed ut propriæ ignorantiae Medelam quæram. Opera tua omnia tribus voluminibus latine edita studiose perlegi, & ob summam illorum eruditionem ut in Bibliotheca nostra statione donarentur, curavi. Utinam *Metaphysicam* quam exorsus es pertexeres. Scire vehementer aveo quodnam tibi de ista re sit consilii. Dolenda

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profecto

perfecto res esset, si tam admirandum opus mancum semper maneret & imperfectum. Maneat vero necesse est, nisi te Authore ad exitum perducatur. Quis enim *alter* erit *Apelles*, qui dimidiato operi manum ultimam admove-
vere sustineat? Noli igitur Curiosos speculatores spe tanta in æternum frustrari. Quod superest Deum ex animo precor ut te lucidissimum in orbe literato fidus diu ab occasu præservet, & post decursum stadium beatorum choro immisceat, & ex ipso sapientiæ fonte immensam tuam cognoscendi sitim tandem expleat. Sic exoptat

Dovotissimus Tui & tuorum

Scriptorum Cultor

Johannes Norris.

Dabam Oxon. ex
 Coll. Om. An.
 Jan. 8. 1684.

Doctor

Sir,

Dr More's *Answer.*

I Have received your very civil and elegant Latin Letter, but answer you according to my constant use to our own Countrey men, in English. You have therein such significations of your kindness and esteem for me and my writings, that you have thereby obliged me to a professed readiness to serve you in any thing that lies in my power. And therefore without any further Ceremony I shall endeavour, as touching those two difficulties you propound, to give you the best satisfaction I can. The first difficulty, if I understand you aright, is this: How that *Immobile Extensum* distinct from matter which in my *Enchiridium Metaphysicum* I demonstrate to exist, can truly be said to be infinite, when as it has *all* its parts that are or can be *coexistent at once*. Because to exist according to *all* its parts *at once* is to be *included* within certain limits, as any number how big soever is contained under

under some certain species of Number, and therewithal conceived finite as the term [*All*] also implies. And therefore *successive Quantity* seems more capable of being infinite then *permanent Quantity*, because there may be still more parts coming on; whereas in *Permanent Quantity* all the parts are at once, and that term [*All*] includes an actual bounding of the whole. This I conceive is the full scope of the first difficulty propounded.

To which I briefly answer first, That that *Immobile Extensum* distinct from matter, being really a substance Incorporeal, I do not conceive that the Term [*Parts*] in a Physical sense does properly belong thereto, every Incorporeal substance or spirit, according to my notion of things, being *Ens unum per se & non per aliud*, and therefore utterly indiscerpible into parts, it implying a contradiction, that this of the substance or Essence should be divided from that, the entire substance being

being *Ens unum per se & non per aliud*. But understanding by parts onely *Notional* or *Logical* parts, which will consist with this Indiscernibility, wee'll admit the phrase in this sense for more easy and distinct discourse sake, and also of *Totum* and *Omne* and whatever is a kin to them. And the same caution I premize touching the word [*Quantity*] that we take it not in that crass *Physical* sense, such as belongs to matter and bodies, but meerly in that *notional* and *Logical* sense, which is so general that it clashes not at all with the *sacrosanctity*, as I may so speak, of incorporeal substances.

And now secondly to come nearer to the point, if we mind closely and distinctly, what sense we have of those terms *Totum* and *Omne*, we shall certainly discern, that they may signify either the *Entireness-Indefectuousness* or *Perfection* of the thing they are pronounced of, or meerly that there is nothing left out of that subject they are spoken

spoken of, or else they imply also a *comprehensibleness*, *limitableness*, or *exhaustableness* of the number of those parts which are said *all* to be there. In this sense is *Totum* plainly used in *summa totalis* at the foot of a reckoning. But for those that hold Infinity of worlds at once, and infinite Matter, when they will easily acknowledge, That *omnes partes Materiae sunt divisibiles*, understanding by *Materia* a congeries of Atoms; *Omnes Mundi generabiles & corruptibiles*, and *Tota Materia Mundana impenetrabilis*, without the least suspicion that they thereby imply, that there is onely a finite Number of worlds, or parts of Matter, or that all the matter of the Universe taken together is but finite; It is plain that to them the former sense is as easy and natural of *Totum* and *Omne* as the latter; And indeed to speak my own mind, I think it is the most natural and proper of all and the onely true Logical sense of *omne* and *totum*; which
suspends

suspends it self from making the subject, of which it is pronounced, either finite or infinite, but declares onely whatever it be that there is no part left out of that Subject it pronounces of. So that if *Totum*, or *Omne*, or *omnes partes* be pronounced of a Subject infinite, it leaves nothing of that infinite Subject out, nor omits any parts, and consequentially implies the perfect Infinity thereof. So far is it from curbing or terminating it, it reaching as far as that absolute Infinity it is pronounced of. So that it is the subject of which *Omne* & *Totum* are pronounced, when it is finite that makes them have a finite signification, and not the intrinsic sence of those terms themselves. Whence I think we may discern, that there is no Repugnancy to assert that all the parts of that *Immobile Extensum* distinct from Matter do exist together at once, though it be infinite, and that [*All*] in this *Enunciation* does not curb the Immensity of this
Exten-

Extensum, but rather necessarily implies it according to the true Logical Notion thereof, that term being alwaies commensurate, when it is truely used to the subject it is spoken of.

And lastly, it is onely *permanent Quantity*, and *Spiritual*, and *indiscerpi-ble*, whose parts are all at once, that is capable of *absolute Infinity*. But as for *successive Quantity*, it is not capable of being infinite, neither a *parte ante* nor a *parte post*. But your phancy seems unawares to have transferred the property of *successive quantity* to the *permanet*, and so because, so soon as we can say of *successive quantity* there is *all of it*, it implies certainly there is an *end of it*, and so it is finite; so you seem unawares to have imagined, because it is true of the parts of *perman-ent Quantity* that there is *all of them at once*, therefore they are now *exhaust- ed*, as the parts of *successive Quantity* were, and therefore are finite. This I think is the sophisme you put upon
your

your self. But you are the best judge of your own meaning.

Now as for the second difficulty, it seems such to you from your missing my meaning in my bringing in that Instance of Wax drawn out an Ell long. And after reduced into the form of a Globe, suppose no bigger than of an ordinary Nutmeg: An heedless or Idiotick Spectator of this change may haply imagine the dimension of Longitude quite lost thereby, whenas there is not one Atom of the quantity thereof lost by this change of Site, no more than there is of the *substance* of the wax. But what seems lost in Longitude, it is compensated in Latitude and profundity. So say I of the contraction of a created Spirit, suppose from a spherical form, (for we must take some figure or other) of half a yard diameter, to a sphere of a quarter by the Retraction of it self into so much less an *Ubi* (eight times less than before) for as much as nothing of

of its substance is annihilated thereby, nothing of its dimensions is, but what seems to be lost in Longitude, Latitude, and profundity, is gained or compensated in *Essential spissitude*, which is that *fourth dimension* I stand for, that it is in *Rerum Natura*. Which tho it is more particularly belonging to the contraction of one and the same spirit into it self, yet it is also truly found, when any two substances whatever adequately occupy the same *Ubi*; As suppose a Spirit occupyd a *Cube* of Matter of such a *side* or *Diameter*. The spirit and the *Cube* have their proper dimensions each of them in the same *Ubi*, and therefore are an Instance of a real *essential spissitude* in that *Ubi*. And if there were another Spirit in like manner occupying the same *Cube*, there would be still a greater *essential spissitude*. And he that will not grant this *essential spissitude*, He must either list himself with that ridiculous Sect of the *Nullibists*, or that wretched

wretched sect of the *Materialists*, or *Atheists*, that hold there is nothing but matter in the Universe, which I conceive I have again and again demonstrated to be false in this *Enchiridium* of mine. But I suppose out of what has been said, you see plainly now that by the contraction of a Spirit, I mean that of the same spirit, whereby it may occupy a less *Ubi* than before, and not of several spirits so contracted, that they may take up no more space than any one of them did before contraction. And these hints I doubt not are sufficient to one of such quick parts as yours, to make you thoroughly and distinctly understand the meaning of the 7th Section of the 28th chapter of my *Enchiridium Metaphysicum*.

To satisfy your desire of knowing my intention touching the finishing the said *Enchiridium*, I must confess to you freely, that I have no purpose of so doing. I am now of a great Age, above threescore and ten, and have
other

other designs also. And besides, this first part which I have finished is the most useful, the most assured, and yet I add the most difficult of all; and having thoroughly made out the main truths of the existence of Spiritual Substance, and what its nature and Essence is, intelligibly and demonstratively, I make account the greatest business is done, and I may leave the rest to others, especially there being laid in so much already in other Treatises of mine, as you may observe in reading the *Scholia* upon the 21 Sect. of the 28th chapter of the *Enchiridium*. Where yet I have left out what is considerable, my *Cabbala Philosophica*, & Exposition of the *Jewish Mercava*, or *Ezechiel's Vision*, the right understanding whereof contains the choicest secrets of the *Jewish Theosophy* or *Metaphysics*.

This is all for the present, but the repeating of my thanks for the great kindness you seem to have for

C.C.C. Jan.

19. 1684⁵

Worthy Sir,

Your affectionate friend to serve you

Hen. More.

*The second Letter to D^r More.**Sir,*

THe Civility and profound subtilty of your Letter are both so very extraordinary, that I know not which most to admire. Indeed I cannot but look upon it as an infinite Obligation, that a Person of your Age, worth, and Character in the World, should vouchsafe an Answer (and that so Candid a one) to such a green Student as my self, one that just begins to climb that *Tree of Knowledg*, upon whose utmost bough you sit, and is so far from spreading his Name (like you) far and near, that he has scarce lustre enough to enlighten the little Orb wherein he moves.

This great Condescension of yours bespeaks you to be a Person of an excellent spirit, as well as understanding, and engages Me (if possible) to honour and esteem you more than I

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did

did before, and to say of you as *Cicero* in his book *De Legibus* does of *Plato*, *Quem admiror, quem omnibus antepono, quem maxime diligo.*

Sir, I have consider'd and digested your Letter, and I find my satisfaction increaseth with my perusal of it. Which gives me encouragement to trouble you with another Inquiry, especially since I find you *willing* as well as *able* to inform, and that you do not send away those that inquire of you, as the Sullen Oracle did *Augustus*, asking concerning his Successour with

---- Ἀπιδὲ στυγῶν ἐκ βαρῶν ἡμετέρων.

The thing then is this. I am not well resolv'd concerning the Moral Turpitude of Sensuality. Not of such species of it as are complicated and accompany'd with *civil incommodities*, such as *Adultery, Fornication, &c.* (Concerning which 'tis easy to account from those mischiefs, which, considering the present system of the Intellectual world, they necessarily bring up-
on

on Mankind) but of sensuality as such. Now concerning this I inquire, 1. whether there be any Moral Turpitude in it or no. And 2ly, supposing there is, wherein it lies. For my own part I am so divided betwixt Arguments on both sides, that I know not what to resolve. For first that there is some Moral, or intrinsick Turpitude, in Sensuality as such, I am tempted to suspect from the Authority of many great Moralists (especially among the Antients) who, when they lay open the immorality of Adultery or Fornication, do not fetch their Arguments wholly from those ill effects, which either of them has upon the welfare of society, but resolve *part* of their immorality into *Sensuality as such*, abstracted from those other ill Consequences. Besides I observe, that in the Divine Writings (not to say any thing of our Ordinary Oral discourses) such peculiar Epithetes and Adjuncts of infamy are given to Adultery, which can belong to

it on no other score, than as 'tis an act of sensuality. Nay, and as if that were the principal Ingredient, it oftentimes receives a Denomination from the sensuality, but never from the injustice, infidelity, or the like. Thus it is call'd the *sin of uncleanness*. And Adulterers are said to be *unclean* persons, *filthy*, *brutish*, &c. In the like manner *David*, in his Penitentials for that sin, insists much upon its *sensuality*, and accordingly speaks of *washing*, and *cleansing*, and *making clean*. All which seems to imply, that the immorality of Adultery is not *wholly* to be deriv'd from those mischievous effects it has upon *Society*, but does also *partly* (if not *chiefly*) consist in the *mere sensuality*, and consequently that Sensuality as such is immoral.

Againzly (to proceed from *mental* abstraction to *real* separation) there are some acts of sensuality (such as voluntary Pollutions &c.) which are really separated from such ill effects,
and

and yet these by the consent of all Nations were ever condemn'd as dishonorable and immoral, and yet there is nothing in them besides the *sensuality*, and consequently there seems to be a Moral Turpitude even in *Sensuality as such*.

Again 3ly, that there is some natural Turpitude in Sensuality as such, I am apt to believe, when I consider how unanimously 'tis vilify'd and decry'd by those, who were mere strangers to Revelation, and so could not derive this Notion from the prohibition of *some certain Species* of it. Sir I need not tell you, what a Continual Topic for Invectives this has been to the *Platonists* and *Stoicks*. Now how these men, who follow'd the mere Conduct of Nature, should all conspire in such abject and disdainful thoughts of Sensuality, unless it were some way or other disagreeable to the unsophisticate and *genuin relish* of the Soul, I cannot comprehend.

Again 4ly and lastly, that there is some Natural intrinsick Turpitude in Sensuality as such, seems to receive no small confirmation from that *natural shame*, which attends the acting of it, and that not only in Circumstances professedly unlawful, but also in those which are otherwise reputed, whereby men seem conscious to themselves of some incongruity in the *thing as such*.

From this and more that might be alledg'd, it seems to me that there must be some Moral Turpitude in sensuality as such. But now wherein this immorality should ly, I am still to seek. As also I am how to unwind my self from the Difficulties of the other side. For first, I find that the more Modern Masters of Morality (such as *Grotius*, Dr *Cumberland*, *Puffendorf* with many others) resolve the immorality of Adultery wholly into those pernicious effects it has upon Society, without bringing in the *sensuality as such* into any part of the

the Account, which they could not do, did they Apprehend any moral Turpitude in Sensuality as such.

Again 2ly, that there is no moral Turpitude in Sensuality as such, seems to appear from hence, that if there were, it would be so in all its instances, and Consequently even in *Marriage* it self. But 'tis said *τίμιος ὁ γάμος*. So that hence arises a considerable Difficulty. For if there be *no* Moral Turpitude in sensuality as such, then all abstracted Acts of it (as Voluntary Pollutions &c.) must be held *lawful*, which are yet *condemn'd*. And if there *be*, then Marriage must be *condemn'd*, which yet is held *lawful*.

Again 3ly, I can see no reason why that sort of *Corporal indulgency*, which is emphatically call'd *sensuality*, should be charged with any moral Turpitude, when as *other pleasures* of sense (and those perhaps equally intense) are not so. Such as using choice perfumes, eating delicious Sweet-meats, &c. Tis plain

plain these all agree in this, that they are gratifications of sense, and therefore why there should be a Moral Turpitude in one, and not in another, I am yet to learn.

Again 4ly and lastly, to argue from the simple and absolute nature of the thing, I cannot imagine how it should be a Moral incongruity for a man to *please* himself. What malice is there in it either against God, himself, or his Neighbour? For that there is in some particular instance (as in Adultery) or in Degree (as in intemperance) is purely accidental, and therefore ought not to be charged upon sensuality as such.

These considerations do prevail with me to think, that there is no Moral Turpitude in Sensuality as such, that all the Pleasures of sense are in *themselves* equally indifferent, like the *Trees of Paradise*. So that if that, which we here treat of, only be evil, it must be (as the forbidden Fruit) because
made

made so by a Positive law (which yet I know not of) as an instance to try our obedience. But how to reconcile this with the former difficulties, I profess I know not. And here Sir, I desire your unerring hand to lead me out of this Labyrinth, and that at your own leisure, (For I am not in hast, and would by no means be troublesome to you) you would be pleased to give me a Resolution of this whole matter, and that you would not only satisfy the Doubts, but also pardon the boldness of

Most worthy Sir,

*Your most real Friend and
most humble Servant*

J. Norris.

Allsouls Coll.

Jan. 28. 1684.

D^r More's *Answer*.

Sir,

YOU may very well judge me more than ordinarily rude and uncivil, that I have not all this time answered your so friendly and affectionate Letter. But I have such abundance of business lying upon my hands, that I could not find time till now, and foreseeing that I shall be suddenly more busy than before, in this strait of time that I am in, I have chosen, rather than to be still silent, to write, though but *briefly*, and it may be *brokenly* to the point you propound. Viz. concerning the *Moral Turpitude of Sensuality*. You have shewed a great deal of not onely wit and eloquence, but solidity of Reason in pleading *pro* and *con* in the case. But you had proceeded more clearly, if you had first defined what you meant by *sensuality*, (which, according to the ordinary acception of the word, signifies *immorally*, and insinuates

sinuates an irregular and ungovernable indulgence of the pleasure of the grosser senses) and so the business had been less difficult. But considering the whole matter of your arguing on both sides, I perceive you mean no more by sensuality, then the pleasure of what *Jul. Scaliger* in his *Exercitationes* calleth the *sixt sense*. For so he counts *that Tactus veneris*, which some are so taken with. And therefore, if you will, we will state the Question according to his phrase, and it shall be, whether the pleasure of the *sixt sense* have any Moral Turpitude in it. Wherein I will adventure to pronounce, that it has not as such. But to be captivated to that pleasure, so as to make us less capable of that, which is better, or to break the laws of what is just and decorous, this is the Turpitude that is contracted therein, and argues him, that is thus captivated, to be brutish and sensual in the ordinary sense of the word. And therefore it is

no

no wonder such persons are stiled filthy, brutish, and unclean in the holy Scriptures, because the *goatish* nature has got dominion over them. You have urged excellently well for the Turpitude of Sensuality hitherto taken in the usual sense, though prelcinded from the consequent Inconveniencies thereof. But now that *Platonists* decry without Revelation, the delight of corporeal pleasures, and that there is a *natural shame* of having to do with those pleasures of the *sixt sense*, this looks like a shrewd argument for an *innate turpitude* in those very pleasures themselves, though in lawful circumstances; But yet I conceive this instinct of natural shame, if rightly interpreted, does not so much intimate any *Moral Turpitude* in having to do with the pleasures of the *sixt sense*, as admonishes us, that though these things rightly circumstantiated have no Moral Turpitude in them, yet such is the nobleness of the Soul of man, that
 such

such gross enjoyments are exceedingly below her, who is designed for an *Angelical life*, where *they neither marry, nor are given in marriage*, and therefore even nature has taught her to *sneak*, when, she being Heaven-born, demits her noble self to such *earthly drudgery*. If this Passion of Venereal shame be rightly interpreted, I suppose this is all it signifies, and not that there is any *intrinsick Immorality* or Turpitude in the pleasures of the *sixt sense*.

But for sensuality taken in the ordinary sense, of which Adultery is a *specimen*, most certainly there is a foulness and uncleanness in it, distinct from what it sins against *Political Society*, which by no means is the *adequate measure* of sound Morality, but there is a *Moral Perfection* of human nature *antecedent* to all Society. I pray read what I have writ on this Argument in my *Scholia* on the 3 Sect. of the 4 chapter of the first Book of my *Enchriridium*

um Ethicum. Which will save me the labour of adding any thing more here. But when the matter is *simply* the perception of the *sixt sense*, there τίμιον ὁ γάμοι. This rightly phrasing the point in question takes away all the difficulties, that would infer *no* moral Turpitude, where there *is* such, or *any* moral Turpitude, where there is *none*. To your third plea for no moral Turpitude I answer, that corporeal pleasures in eating and drinking &c. if they be *irregular* or *excessive*, have a moral Turpitude in them. Viz. if they are so much as to hinder and lessen the better enjoyments of the Soul, and obstruct the design of living κατὰ τὸ κρείττον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, as *Aristotle* some where speaks, and makes our bodies a less commodious Temple for the spirit of God to dwell in. And to your fourth and last, wherein you say you cannot imagine how it should be a moral Incongruity for a man to *please* himself. *What malice is there in it either against*
God,

God, *himself*, or *his neighbour* ? You say right, he may mean no ill to *himself*, but he may *mistake* himself, and out of ignorance of the dignity of his own nature, take that to be *chiefly himself*, which is least of all himself, or the meanest part of him, I mean that part which is common to him with the Brutes, the pleasures of which life the more he endeavours to shun, as far as is consistent with the health of his body, and disdains to be captivated with the gratifications of the flesh, the more surely will he arise into the enjoyment of such a life, as is unexpressibly above all the pleasures this mortal flesh can afford. But he that layes his hand to the plough and looks back is not fit for the kingdom of God. There must be assiduity, constancy, and a perpetual guard and watchfulness over a mans waies, over the Inclinations of of his mind and outward words and actions, and devotional addresses to God for further *illumination* & strengths,
to

to carry on the work of *real Regeneration*, and the issue will at last be ineffably pleasing and glorious. And he, that gives himself up to such a *dispensation* of life, will not miss of meeting with the *clearness* of all *useful t. uths*. And when his *true self* is *awakened* in him, it will be a *Moral Congruity* to please himself, that is, that Intellectual and Godlike life and sense raised in him. And all the *Trees of Paradise*, which God has planted, the *pleasures of all the six Senses*, he may taste of, so long as he keeps in the life aforesaid, and makes that the measure of all his inferiour Enjoyments, that he is not *lessened above*, by being captivated by any thing *below*. Then the pleasure of the fixt sense is not forbid, nor is there any thing forbid in the *Paradise of God*, but the irregularity of our own lust and will. I hope out of this you will pick out my meaning, though this pinch of time that I am in, has made me but huddle up things

things together with less order than I usually endeavour to do. Thus in some haste committing you to Gods gracious keeping, I take leave and rest,

Dear Sir

Your affectionate friend to serve you
 Hen. More.

C.C.C. April.
 13. 1685.

The third Letter to Dr. More.

Sir,

SUDDAINLY after my receiving your last, I withdrew into the Country, whence I am but lately return'd. I had no manner of conveniency of writing to you there, but now I have, I think, my self obliged to use it forthwith, lest you should suspect that I am forgetful of *you*, or of the *thanks* I owe you for your last excellent Letter. It gave me much satisfaction in several things, and I read it (as indeed I do every
 M thing

thing of yours) with a *peculiar* pleasure. But since I have begun to move a Question, and you have been so kind as to Communicate to me your thoughts concerning it, I hope you will not take it amiss, if in order to the clearing up the whole matter I here reassume it, and desire from you some further satisfaction about it.

The Summ of the Determination which you give to the Difficulty I proposed, is (if I understand you right) in short this. You distinguish of Sensuality as it signifies *Concretely* and *immorally* either as to *Measure* or other *Circumstance*, Or as 'tis *Simply* the *Perception* of the *pleasure* of the *sixth Sense*. Which last (that which I meant in my inquiry) you acquit from all Moral Turpitude. Now I confess I am and ever was perfectly herein of your judgment, and that (among other reasons) because of the *Divine Institution* of *Matrimony*. Only there is one thing that still sticks with me. I find my self still
intangled

intangled in one of my Difficulties which, tho in your Answer you take notice of it, appears to my apprehension the most considerable of all. 'Tis this, that if there be no Moral Turpitude in the simple perception of Venerable pleasure, then all *Abstracted* acts of it, such as voluntary pollutions, lascivious embraces &c. must be accounted lawful, which are yet condemn'd by all Moral and Divine writers. The reason of the Consequence is, because there seems to be nothing in such abstracted acts, besides the *simple Perception of the pleasure of the sixth Sense*. For as for excess, Captivation of Spirit, too sensitive applications and the like, these are merely *accidental*, and equally incident to the same acts in all other Circumstances.

This is the short of the Difficulty, which I need not pursue in more words to a person of your exquisite Conception. Sir I humbly crave your sense in this point, (the only thing not clear'd

in your Answer) which if you please to vouchsafe me, you will no less *ingage* the *Affections* than *inform* the *Judgment* of (most worthy Sir)

Your most real and highly Obligated

Friend and Servant

J. Norris.

Dr More's *Answer.*

Sir,

IT is now above a Month since I received yours. But Indisposition of Body, and several unexpected Occurrences have hindred me from writing till now. If my memory fail me not, I intimated to you in my last, that I would read over again that Sermon, which you was pleased to dedicate to me, and signify to you more of my mind touching it. Wherefore to be as good as my word, I will take notice of a Passage or two, before I answer this present Letter.

You

You fall, *pag.* 10. upon a very *subtile Subject*, viz. What it is, in which our pretense to free Agency may be safely grounded, whether in the *will* or *understanding*. And in order to decide the point in hand, you do with good judgment declare against talking of the *will* and *understanding*, as faculties *really distinct* either from *one another*, or the *Soul her self*. But tho you begin thus hopefully, yet methinks you run your self into an unnecessary nooze of Fatality, by granting the Soul necessarily wills as she understands; you know that of the Poet.

---*Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.*---And for my part, I suspect there are very few men, if they will speak out, but they have experienced that truth. Else they would be in the state of *sincerity*, which over few are.

But now that you would salve the *Phenomenon* of free Agency, *pag.* 11. by making it depend upon the degrees of *Advertency* or *Attention* which the Soul

uses, and which to use either more or less, is fully and immediatly in her own power, this is an Invention ingeniously excogitated, to escape the difficulty you have cast your self into, by admitting the Soul necessarily wills as she *understands*, and necessarily understands as the *Object appears* to her. For thus indeed we were *frozen up* in a *rigid Fatality* and *Necessity*. But this does not cast the ground of free Agency upon the Soul as *Intelligent*, more than as *Volent*, if so much. For unless she *will* exert her Advertency or Attention, how can she to any degree advert or attend to the Object? So that the ground of free Agency will be still resolved into the Soul, not as *Intelligent*, but as *Volent*, and *willing* to understand the nature of every Object she is concerned to speculate.

Moreover, though the Soul be willing to exert her Advertency or Attention to the Object, this *alone* seems but a defective Principle as to the re-
deeming

deeming us into the ability and freedom of closing with what is best, as discerning it to be so. For as the eye, let it ἀτενίζεν never so much, if it be vitiated in it self, cannot rightly discern the condition of the visible Object it fixes its sight upon ; so the mind of man, let him set himself never so diligently to contemplate any *Moral* or *Intelligible* Object, if she be made dim by Moral corruptions and impurities, will not be able or free to close with what is best in the Circumstances that lye before her, being held captive by the vices the Party has not yet purifyed himself from. Wherefore the true ground of our being able and free to chuse what is best, consists rather in the *purity* of the Soul from vice, than in *Advertency* and *Attention* to the Object, while the mind is vitiated and obscured for want of due *purification*. Which the best *Philosophers* and *Christians* have alwaies declared to be requisite to true *Illumination*.

And

And that notable *Instance* of *Martyrdome*, which you bring in to illustrate the case, methinks, may be made rather to illustrate and confirm what I drive at. Viz. that there is something of greater weight than *Advertence* or *Attention*, that will enable a man to witness to the truth with his blood. For notwithstanding the mere being *notionally convinced*, that sin, or such a sin as the denying of Christ, is the greatest evil in the world, though he never so closely attend to this truth in the *Notion* thereof, if the old man or carnal mind be still alive in him, that crafty Serpent will not fail to suggest such evasions or Tergiversations, as will excuse him from suffering, and that, it may be, though he do firmly believe the Torments of Hell, and Joyes of Heaven after this life. For the *Mercy* of God, and *future Repentance*, and *Violence* of the *Temptation*, or *pretense* of making *amends some other way*, and I know not how many other such slim Insinuations,

tions, may befool the Unregenerate man from ever adventuring to suffer Martyrdome.

But he that is to a due degree Regenerate, and made, as *S. Peter* speaks, *Partaker of the Divine nature* ; The Spirit of life in the New Birth being *awakened* in him, and the Love of God in him perfected ; this *New Nature* in him into which he is born from above, having rather *quicker sensations* than the *Animal Nature* it self, this is the thing indeed that will secure the crown of Martyrdom to him, nor will he be liable to be imposed upon by the Carnal mind, to listen to such Evasions and Tergiversations as I mentioned before, but had rather dye a thousand natural Deaths, than *wound and pain* that *life and spirit* into which he is regenerate. Wherefore no fear of pain from man can shake him ; the *Love* of the Lord Jesus and of his life, into which he is regenerate, being *stronger than Death*, and all pains of the *natural*

tural life more tolerable by far to him, than to *wound* and *pain* and *grieve* that *life* and *spirit* in him, which is *supernatural* and *Divine*.

And this is that which the beloved Apostle *S. John* witnesses, 1 Joh. 4. 18. That *there is no fear in Love, but perfect love casteth out fear. Because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not perfected in love.* And towards the beginning of that Chapter he saies, *Greater is he that is in us, than he that is in the world.* Speaking of the Spirit of *Christ*, and the spirit of the *World*. These things I hint to you to let you understand, that sometimes more than the *notional attending* to the hainousness of sin is required to furnish out a *Martyr*. And that our being redeemed into an ability or freedom of chusing what is best, is not from *mere attention* to the Object, but from *Purification, Illumination* and *real Regeneration* into the *Divine Image*. But I cannot insist largely on any thing. *Verbum sapienti sat est.* I will

I will onely take notice of one place more in your ingenious Discourse, and that is, *pag. 15.* where I stumbled a little at your seeming severity towards the *severe Masters*, as you call them, of *Spiritual Mortification*. I confess some passages in them lye fair for your lash. But the high and Hyperbolical expressions of holy and devout men are not to be tryed by the rigid Rules of *Logick* and *Philosophy*, but to be interpreted candidly, according to the scope they aym at. Which is a *perfect exinanition* of our selves, that we may be filled with the *sense* of God, who worketh all in all, and *feelingly* acknowledge what ever good is in us to be from him, and so be no more *elated* for it, than if we had none of it, nor were conscious to our selves we had any such thing. And to be thus *self-dead* and *self-annihilated* is the onely sure safe passage into *eternal life, peace* and *glory*. And is the most safe and lovely condition of the Soul that possibly

fibly can be attained to. All knowledge to this is but vain fluttering, a Feather in a mans Cap tossed with the wind. Here is *firm Anchorage, Rest, and such a Peace* as passes all understanding. This is the proper Character of Christ and his followers. *Learn of me for I am humble and meek, and you shall find rest for your souls.* And blessed are the *poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of Heaven.* This *Mystical Death or spiritual Annihilation*, whereby all *self-wishing* is destroy'd, is the peculiar transcendency of the *Christian* state above that of the noblest *Heathen Philosophers* that ever were. And who ever feels it will find it so. For these are *Divine sensations*, and lye deeper than *imaginative Reason* and *Notion*. Nor is there any *mistake* in this state devoid of all *self-attribution*. For tho the soul attribute not to her self what good she has in possession, yet she denies not but that she has it. Like that profession of S. Paul Gal. 2. 20. *I am crucified with*

with Christ, nevertheless I live, yet not I but Christ liveth in me, namely by his Spirit. And being this Christian state is the most perfect state the soul of man is capable of, we are obliged by way of duty to endeavour after it as much as we can, according to that of the Stoick, Τὸ βέλτιστον φαινόμενον νόμῳ ἔσω ἀποδεχάμεθα. But I have dwelt upon this point also longer than I intended. And I know you will pardon my freedom in thus descanting upon these two passages of your learned and Elegant Discourse. I will pass now to your Letter, and endeavour to finish the point betwixt us there, and make up what you think defective in my other Letter.

We are both agreed in this, that the *simple perception* of the pleasure of the *sixt sense* hath no moral Turpitude in it. But you say hereupon that there is one difficulty still you are entangled in, which, though I took no notice of in my Letter, yet seems to you the greatest

greatest and most considerable of all, namely, If there be no Moral Turpitude in the simple perception of Venereal Pleasure, then all abstracted Acts of it, such as voluntary Pollutions, lascivious Embraces, &c. must be accounted lawful, which are yet condemned by all Moral and Divine Writers. And the Reason of the consequence, you say is, because there is nothing in such abstracted Acts besides the simple perception of the pleasure of the *sixt sense*. For as for Excess, Captivation of Spirit, too sensitive Applications and the like, these are merely Accidental, and equally incident to the same acts in all other circumstances. I suppose you mean in the state of Matrimony, where the perception of this pleasure is lawful and allowed.

There was in my former Letter what might answer this difficulty, tho you took no notice of it. But here I will answer more fully and gradually.

First therefore, though we should admit

admit, that the perception of the pleasure of the *sixt sense* in such Circumstances, as you describe, had nothing in it immoral, yet certainly it were a thing *Disangelical*, if I may so speak, and *undivine*; whenas we being born to that high condition of Angels, we ought to breath after that state, and as *Aristotle* somewhere adviseth (against that vulgar Proverb τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπου ὄντας) we ought ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀπαθανάτιζεν, to affect the life of the immortal Angels, who neither marry nor are given in marriage, and therefore to have nothing to do with that pleasure farther then necessity requires, not for the *mere pleasures sake*, which Nature has stigmatized with the sense of shame accompanying it, on purpose to remind us of that immortal and Angelical Condition we are called to, where *that* pleasure is *perfectly silent*; though at the Resurrection, we then having *organized* bodies, it were hard to conceive, that we should be like the

Idols

Idols of the *Heathen*, have eyes and see not, ears and hear not, noses and smell not, no not so much as the *fragrant odours of Paradise*, nor tast of the *food of Angels*, as the Psalmist somewhere expresses it. Which *Philosophical Hypothesis*, if it be true, there is an Obvious Reason why the *sixt sense* has the stamp of shame upon it, and the other five not, and is no contemptible argument of the immortal state of the Soul out of this earthly body: so handsomely are these things complicated together.

Secondly, it being apparent to any, that has but the least sagacity in interpreting Nature, that the pleasure of the *sixt sense* is in order to that weighty end of *Propagation*, it is most manifestly a gross *abuse* of the pleasure of the *sixt sense*, to affect it, and excite it merely for the pleasures sake, the end of God and Nature being frustrated at the same time, and the *due use* of that sensation grossly *perverted*. If
this

this be not *ἄσκησις*, an *unnatural Act* or the transgression of the Law of Nature, what is? so that it cannot be said that this is *the simple perception* of the pleasure of the *sixt sense*, but is the perception thereof in *such Circumstances*, as make it abominable. And here are broken the Laws of what is *fit* and *decorous*, as I intimated to you in my former Letter, and which might have afforded an Answer to this scruple you now again raise in this.

But thirdly and lastly, There is an Analogie betwixt the pleasure of the *sixt sense*, and the pleasure of *Tast*. The former as it is in order to the propagation of the *species* of living Creatures, so the latter is in order to the sustentation of the *Individuals*. The pleasure of the tast is to engage the Animal to eat sufficiently to nourish him and to renew his strength. Now suppose any man had found some Art or Trick, to enjoy the pleasure of the Tast of Meats and Drinks all the day

N

long

long in a manner, and from day to day, though he eat no more for strength and sustenance than others do, were not this man most wretchedly sensual and gluttonous? How then can the exciting of the Venereal pleasure by voluntary Pollutions, &c. be thought to be any other than the foulest Act of Lust that may be, thus to indulge to this carnal pleasure meerly for the pleasures sake, against the Law of God and Nature. Wherefore you see that the Reason of your Consequence is very infirm, and that there is something in those *Abstract Acts*, as you call them besides the *simple perception* of the pleasure of the *sixt sense*. For the very *Abstractiveness* of this pleasure from the natural end and use of it, is its *Essential Filth* or *Moral Turpitude*, to be abhorred of all holy Souls, and abominated for the reasons I have mentioned. Nor is the pleasure of the *sixt sense* lawfully enjoyed, but in the state of Matrimony. But excess Capti-
vation

vation of Spirit, &c. are lawful in no state that I know of.

And thus you have as full Resolution of this point as I can give, and if it may have the success to prove satisfactory to you, I shall think my pains well bestow'd. But if upon a deliberate perusal of what I have writ, and an impartial improvement thereof to your best satisfaction you can, there should chance to remain any further scruple, I shall, if you write me word of it, readily endeavour to ease you thereof as it becomes

Dear Sir,

*Your faithful and affectionate
Friend to serve you*

Hen. More.

C. C. C. Jan.
16. 1682.

*The fourth Letter to D^r More.**Sir,*

THere was no need of an Apology either for the *lateness* of your *Answer*, or your *freedom* in descanting upon some passages in my *Sermon*. I can very easily be contented to stay for what by its excellency will reward my *Patience*, and can easily *forgive* him that will make me *wiser*. For I am concern'd for no Opinion any farther than I think it *true*, and so far I am, and therefore as I profess my self heartily obliged to you for your kind and excellent endeavours to rescue me from an *Errour*, so I must beg your leave to return something in defence of my *Hypothesis*. Which I question not but you will readily grant, especially when I assure you that I argue only to be better inform'd. And that your Authority is so Sacred with me that nothing less than the desire of

Truth

Truth should ingage me to oppose it.

Presuming therefore upon your pardon, I shall first offer something in confirmation of my Opinion, and then consider what you alledge to the contrary. And in the first place 'tis agreed betwixt us that there must be a *Τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν*, *some Principle of free Agency in Man*. All that does or can fall under debate is what is the *primary* and *immediate subject* of this free Agency. Now this being a *Rational* perfection must be primarily subjected either in the *understanding* or in the *will*, or (to speak more accurately) either in the Soul *as Intelligent*, or in the Soul *as Volent*. That the latter cannot be the *Root of Liberty* will be sufficiently clear, if this one Proposition be fully made out, viz. that the will necessarily follows the Dictate of the understanding, or that the Soul necessarily wills as she understands.

Now for the *Demonstration* of this, I shall desire but this one *Postulatum*,

which I think all the Schools of Learning will allow me, viz. that the Object of the Soul *as Volent* is *Apparent good*, or that the Soul cannot will *Evil as Evil*. Now good *Apparent* or evil *Apparent*, is the same in other terms with that, which is *apprehended* or *judg'd* to be good or evil respectively. (For to appear thus or thus does not *ponere aliquid in re*, but is an *Extrinfecal Denomination* of the Object in reference to the *Faculty*.) If therefore good *Apparent* be the Object of the will, good *Apprehended* will be so too, and Consequently the Soul necessarily *wills* as she *understands*, otherwise she will chuse *Evil as Evil*, which is against the *supposition*.

This I take to be as clear a *Demonstration* of the Souls necessarily *willing as she understands* upon the supposition that our *Postulatum* be true, as can be afforded in the *Mathematicks*. But for more Illustration, we will bring it to an example. And for the present let it

it be that of *S. Peter's* denying of his Master. Here I say that *S. Peter* judged that part *most eligible* which he *chose*, that is, he judged the *sin* of denying his Master, at that present juncture, to be a *less evil* than the *danger* of not denying him, and so chose it. Otherwise if he had then actually thought it a *greater evil*, all *that* whereby it *exceeded* the other, he would have chosen *gratis*, and consequently would have will'd *evil as evil*.

There was therefore undoubtedly an errour in his *understanding*, before there was any in his *will*. And so it is in the case of every sinner, according to those trite sayings, *Omnis peccans ignorat*, and *Nemo malus gratis* &c. And therefore tis that in Scripture, *Vertue* is expressed by the names of *Wisdom* and *understanding*, and *Vice* goes under the names of *Folly* and *Errour*. All who commit sin think it, at the instant of Commission, all things consider'd, a *lesser evil*, otherwise 'tis impossible

sible they should commit it. But *this* (as the Psalmist expresses it) *is their Foolishness*, and in another place, *have they any understanding that work wickedness?* From all which I conclude that the will is necessarily determin'd by the Dictate of the understanding, or that the Soul necessarily wills as she understands, so that in this sense also that of the Stoick is verify'd, τὸ βέλτιστον φαινόμενον νόμῳ ἔσω ἀπεράβαστον.

The Soul therefore *as Volent* cannot be the *immediate subject* of *Liberty*. If therefore there be any such thing as *Free Agency*, the seat of it must be in the Soul *as Intelligent*. But does not the Soul *necessarily understand* as the Object *appears*, as well as she *necessarily wills* as she *understands*? she does so, and therefore I do not place the Seat of Liberty in the soul *as judging* or forming a Judgment, for *that* I confess to be determin'd by the *appearance* of things. But though it be necessary that the Soul *judge* as things appear,

pear, yet 'tis not necessary (except on-
 ly in *self evident Propositions*) that
 things should *appear* thus or thus, but
that will wholly depend upon the de-
 grees of *Advertency* or *Attention*; *such*
 a degree being requisite to make the
 Object appear *thus*, and *such* a degree
 to appear *otherwise*. And this *Adver-*
tency is that wherein I place the seat of
 free agency. *Lower* than this I discern
 not the least glimps of it, and *higher*
 I cannot go. Here therefore I con-
 ceive I have good reason to fix, and
 to affirm that the only *Ἀυτεξέσσιον* of the
 Soul consists in her having an *immedi-*
ate power to *Attend* or not *Attend*, or
 to attend *more* or *less*. I say an *imme-*
diate power, for if you will have an *ex-*
press act of the *will* interposed, that act
 of the will must have a *Practical Judg-*
ment, that Judgment an *Objective ap-*
pearance, that appearance another *At-*
tention, that attention another *Will*, and
 so on *ad Infinitum*. I think it therefore
 reasonable to stop at the First.

I shall

I shall now apply my self to your *Objections*. And first, against the necessity of the Soul's willing as she understands you alledge that of the *Poet*, Concerning *Medea* --- *Videō meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor* --- I answer by distinguishing the *Antecedent*, a thing may be judg'd good either by a *Speculative* or *universal* knowledg, and that I do *not* alwaies follow, Or by a *Practical* Knowledg, when I look upon it and pronounce of it *pro hic & hunc* as cloath'd with all its Circumstances, and that I *do* alwaies follow.

But you farther urge that if so, then there would be no such thing as Sin against *Knowledg*. Or (which is the same otherwise worded) that then men would be in a state of *sincerity*. To this I answer, that a sinner according to this *Hypothesis* may be said to sin both *knowingly* and *ignorantly* too in different respects. He sins *knowingly* in as much as he knows in the *Theory* or by an *Habitual* judgment, that such a
Fact

Fact is a Sin, and yet he sins *ignorantly* too, in as much as either he does not *actually attend* to that *Speculative* and *Habitual* judgment of his, that such a thing is a sin, Or if he does, yet he thinks it upon the whole matter to be a *lesser evil*; which indeed is *implicitly* and *confusely* though not *explicitly* that tis not a sin, because that which is *truely* a lesser evil cannot be a sin, for a sin can never be *eligible*, but a *lesser evil may*.

And whereas you say that *Advertency*, or *Attention* to the Object is a *defective Principle as to the redeeming us into the ability of closing with what is discern'd best*, I confess I can easily conceive how a man may be defective in his *Attention*, but not how *Attention* it self if duely applied can be defective towards *true illumination* though in the midst of *Moral Corruptions*. All that can be said is, that these moral Corruptions may divert the Soul from sufficiently *attending* to the *Beauty of Holiness*,

Holiness, and this I take to be the true and ultimate ground of all sin, and here tis I fix the necessity of *Grace and Divine assistance*.

And whereas you say, that the *Instance of Martyrdom* which I alledg for my Opinion, does rather confirm that there must be something of more weight than *Advertency* to inable a man to dy for the Truth; And that though a man be *notionally* convinc'd that the denying of Christ is the greatest evil in the world, and attend never so closely to this Notion, he may yet find such evasions as will excuse him from suffering; For you say the *Mercy of God*, and *future Repentance*, and *of the temptation*, or *pretence of making amends some other way*, may do it.

To this I reply, that he who is *notionally* convinc'd that the denying of Christ is the greatest evil in the world, cannot possibly chuse it so long as he continues that Judgment, or Notional Conviction, there being according
to

to his *then apprehension* no greater evil for the avoiding of which he should think it eligible. If therefore he should *then* chuse it, he must chuse it *as a greater evil*, that is, *simply as evil*, than which I think there can be no greater absurdity. As for those Considerations therefore which you subjoyn, *the Mercy of God, future repentance, &c.* these cannot prevail with him to chuse the denying of Christ *while* he judges it the greatest evil, any more than they can induce him to chuse evil as such. They may indeed prevail with him in the present juncture *not to think it the greatest evil*, nay to pronounce it a lesser evil than the evil of Pain, and then no wonder if he chuse it. But this I do not conceive to make any thing *against* my Hypothesis, but to be rather *according to it*.

As to what you remark concerning *Humility* and *Spiritual Mortification*, I think I may be perfectly of your mind without retracting or altering any thing

thing of my Sermon, for I don't find, if the business be sifted to the bottom, that we differ any thing at all.

Your Determination concerning the pleasure of the sixth sense, I submit to as very full and satisfactory. And I have only one thing more to move concerning it. Which is, that since you make the *Abstractedness* of this pleasure from the *natural end* of it, that of propagation, to be its *Essential Turpitude*, whether this does not conclude against all those who Marry in such an age, when 'tis impossible according to the course of nature, that this End should be serv'd. And whether there be any difference according to your Measures between the enjoyment of the *sixth sense* in such Circumstances or the like, and Voluntary Pollutions. I would willingly know your sense in this matter.

And now (Sir) all I have to do is to return you extraordinary thanks for your many and great Civilities, to
 desire

desire a long Continuance of your health and welfare, and favourable construction of the defence which I make against your Reflections. That tis not in the least from a design of wrangling and opposition, but from a perswasion of my being at present in the right, and an earnest desire of being Wiser. I am truely indifferent which side of the Question be true, all that I am concern'd for is to *know which is so*. And being so indifferent, as I am the more likely to *find the Truth*, so I hope I am so to *obtain pardon* from you who are so great a Friend to it. Which yet you will be the more ready to grant when you consider how much your judgment (tho not in this particular fully assented to) is yet admired and esteemed by (Most honour'd and Dear Sir)

*Your most obliged Friend
and Servant*

J. Norris.

D^r More's *Answer*.

Sir,

I Have received yours, and reading the Confirmation of your Hypothesis (which I took the boldness a little to vellicate) and your Answer to my Objections against it, I could not but observe your ingenious dexterity therein with pleasure. And yet I must ingenuously confess that I still stick where I was, nor can conceive but that the free Agency we are conscious to our selves of, is placed in the Soul as *Volent* as much as *intelligent*, because this *Volency*, as I may so speak, is *implied* in her *Attention* or *Advertency*, and is a necessary requisite thereof. The thing therefore that I affirm being this viz. That this *αὐτεξέχαστον* is placed in the Soul as *Volent* as well as *Intelligent*, the Volency of the Soul being required to make thole free attentions or Advertencies on the object, let us see how you demon-

demonstrate that it cannot be feated in the Soul as *Volent*.

Your argument in breif is this, (For I intend to answer your Letter with all possible brevity I can) That since the Soul cannot will evil as evil she must necessarily will and and chuse according as the *betterness* of the Object appears to her understanding, otherwise she will chuse evil as evil which is against the supposition. To this I answer, that though she does not chuse according as the betterness of the Object appears to her understanding, it does not thence follow that she will chuse evil as evil, but that she will chuse a *natural* good and prefer it before the *Moral*. So that the absurdity of chusing evil as evil here vanisheth, and the demonstration falls to the ground. And this was the case of S. *Peter* in denying Christ. The Object of his choice was that *natural good*, his security from pain and punishment, which he preferred before that *Moral*
O *good*

good the faithful and professed adhesion to his Lord and Master Christ Jesus. Nor could the *understanding* of *S. Peter* err so grossly as not in the *Notion* to think that faithfulness to his Lord Christ was better absolutely than the securing himself from pain and punishment (as indeed there is no comparison betwixt the Moral or Divine good and the natural) but there was wanting in this Act the *exertion of his will* towards the *Divine good*; or else the *Divine Nature* or *Grace* was wanting, whence he slipt into this choice of the meaner good.

And as for that Maxim, *Omnis peccans ignorat*; If it be true in that *Universality* the sense is, that whoever sins it is out of defect of either *Notional knowledg* or *inward sense*, such as accompanies *real Regeneration*; in which sense the ἀναίσθητοι, *Insensati* in Scripture are to be understood, and on the contrary the *Pythagorick* ἐναισθησία. Those that want this ἐναισθησία, though they have

have a *Notional knowledg* of the thing, yet they may sin, and that from the want of this *sensibility of Spirit*. But he that is born of God sins not because the seed remains in him, this *life or sensibility* in the New Birth which is an higher and more effectual Principle then *Notional knowledg*. Which alone is not able to determine the choice of the Soul to a Moral or Spiritual Object without the accession of the other. For *life* and *sense* can onely counterpoise *life* and *sense*, not *mere Notion*. Whence the τὸ βέλτιστον φαινόμενον, i. e. the Moral or Divine good is not followed, but what is pleasing and grateful to the *Animal nature*. So that the soul here wills or chuses against the dictate of her understanding, which is the sin against *conscience*, otherwise there would be no such thing.

The cheif Pith of the last Paragraph of your Confirmation is this. Though it be necessary the Soul judg as things appear yet 'tis not necessary (except

onely in self-evident Propositions) that things should *appear* thus or thus, but *that* will wholly depend upon the degrees of *Advertency* or *Attention*. And in this, say you, I place the seat of free Agency, viz. in *an immediate power in the Soul of attending or not attending or of attending more or less to the Objects that occur*. I demand therefore is this any thing more then what is couched in that of the Poet,

*Quid verum atque bonum quæro &
rogo & omnis in hoc sum,*

Viz: A sincere Inquisition (and *sincerity* is immediatly in our power, that is, it is in our power to do as well as we can) after that Truth and Good in which human Happiness consists. Which if it be done in a *mere Notional way* there will still remain that liberty I mentioned above of the Soul chusing contrary to the dictates of her understanding. So that there will be more liberties then you conclude for in this Paragraph. But if this diligent and
sincere

sincere Inquisition, or sincere desire of knowing *what is man and whereto serveth he, what is his good and what is his evil* be absolutely sincere, it cannot fail to inquire what is the most safe and effectual way to have Objects duly represent themselves to the understanding as the Objects of sight to a pure and clear eye. And what can this be but the *Purification* of the soul as I intimated in my last to you, which is by *Mortification* and *real Regeneration*, that the *Divine Principle* may be more fully *awakened* in us, and so become *life* and *sense* to us in virtue whereof the soul will be free and able to chuse what is absolutely the better, that is to prefer the Moral or Divine Good before that which is Animal or Natural, and if this state advance to the highest, never to chuse any, if they stand in competition but the Moral or Divine, according to that of *S. John* above mentioned, *He that is born of God sinneth not* &c. Wherefore so far as I

see, it may be but a λογομαχία betwixt us as to this point where you place the αὐτεξέχαστον of the Soul in her immediate power of using the best means she can to find out what is her best good or readiest means to true happiness and riddance of sin and error. Which taken in the full sense thereof as I have intimated, is, as I conceive, a sound and useful Theorem and well adapted for the chastising of the world for their *sloth* and *laziness* in these things.

We come now to your Answers to my Objections. And to that of *Video meliora proboque* you answer indeed learnedly and scholastically, by saying, a thing may be judged good either by a *Speculative* or *Universal* knowledg, or by a *practical* knowledg when it is lookt upon and pronounced of *pro hic & nunc* as cloathed with all its circumstances, the former is not alwaies followed but the latter is. But is there any thing more in this but that the *Eligent* (when as both these know-

knowledges are speculative or universal, the former already *granted*, the other plainly *implied* by the choice of the Eligent, who in such circumstances judges the choice is *universally* to be made, else how is he obliged to make it?) but that the Humour of the Eligent onely has made this latter practical by putting it into practice instead of the former, it being clothed with the circumstances of *Jucundum* or *Utile*, when the other recommends it self onely upon the account of *Honestum*: which though he sees (as *Medea* sayes *Video meliora proboque---* and that *hic & nunc*, for she speaks of the *present* case and time, yet *deteriora sequor*) notwithstanding he declines that which is *absolutè & simpliciter melius* according to his own judgment, and closes with that which *seems melius*, that is, *Utilius* and *jucundius* to himself, to his Animal Nature against the Dictate of the Divine. This is the clear case of the Controversy freed from the
clouds

clouds of the *School*. And therefore notwithstanding what you have answered it is plain that the Soul may *understand Notionally* and *actually* better then she *practises*, and not follow the dictate of her Understanding but of her Animal Appetite.

To my Objection against your Hypothesis, That thence every man would be *sincere*, nor any sin against *knowledg*, you answer, That a sinner may be said to sin both knowingly and ignorantly, he may know in Theory or habitual judgment such a fact is a sin, and yet be ignorant by not *actually attending* to his *Habitual knowledg*; or by judging the sin upon the whole matter to be the *lesser evil* and thence *implicitly* to be no sin, and so not sin against knowledg. But I answer, It is incredible that one that has an habitual knowledg, that such a thing is a sin should not remember it is so when he meets with it or is entering upon it. It is as if one had the habitual Idea of
such

such a person in his mind, and should not remember it is he when he meets him in the very teeth. Nor can he judg the sin upon the whole matter to be the lesser evil, but he must in the mean time remember it is a *sin* and so commit it against his knowledg, onely sugar'd over with the circumstance of *Jucundum* or *Utile* or both. This Composition though there be *Ratsbain in the Sugar*, makes the Soul listen to the dictate of the Animal Appetite and let go that of Moral reason, tho they both clamour in her ears at once. And there the Soul against the understanding concludes for the suggestion of the Animal Appetite, that bears her in hand, that such a sin with pleasure and profit is better then an Act of virtue with pain and wordly loss. This I conceive is the naked case of the busines. Nor does this choice seem to be of a lesser evil to the Soul as *Intellectual*, which dictates the contrary, but as *sensual or Animal*.

To

To your Answer to my third Objection of Attention or (Advertency) being a *defective Principle*, That though a man may be defective in his Attention, yet you cannot easily conceive how *Attention it self* if duly applied can be defective: I reply, that mere Attention of it self in a Morally corrupt mind, let it be never so great can no better rightly discover the Moral Object, than the vitiated eye the Natural. It is the *Purity* of the Soul through *Regeneration* that enables her to behold the beauty of Holiness as our Saviour speaks, *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God*. There is no seeing of God but by being purified and regenerate into his Image. Ἐργάζουας τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν αὐτὴν. As Plotinus somewhere has it, touching the *Divine Pulchritude*. *If thou beest it, thou seest it*. If we be regenerate into the Image of the *Eternal Pulchritude* we then shall see it, having (if I may use the Poets expression here) --- *Incoctum generoso pectus*

Etus Honeſto. But if this Principle of life be not ſufficiently awakened in us, no Attention is ſufficient to make us rightly diſcern the beauty of Holineſs, but onely a *ſhadowy Notion* or *Meager Monogrammatical Picture* thereof, which will not avail though you uſe all the Attention in the world againſt the dictates of the *Animal ſenſe and life unmortified*, in the day of trial. Whence the defect of this Principle alone, is evident.

But if you mean by ſufficiently attending to the beauty of Holineſs the diligent and ſincere Inquiſition after Truth and Holineſs, which implies our ſerious entering into a *Method of Purification* and clearing our *inward Eyeſight* by our reſolved progreſs in the way of *Mortification* and thereby of *real Regeneration*, whereby the *Divine Life and ſenſe* will ſufficiently at length be *awakened* to counterpoize and overcome the *ſway and importunity* of the *Animal life and ſenſe*; the neglect of
this

this we shall be both agreed in, that it is the ultimate ground of all sin, and that we shall discern, when we seriously make trial, the necessity of *Grace* and *Divine Assistance* to carry us thro so weighty an Enterprize as you rightly note in this Paragraph; which I hope I have sufficiently spoke to by this. I will onely add, that, what occurs *Psal. 48. vers. 5, 6, 7.* seems a figure of this *Spiritual Progress* towards the beauty of Holiness in virtue of which every one at last appears before God in Sion, according to that promise of our Saviour, *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.*

And now lastly for your Reply to what I said touching the *Instance of Martyrdome*, which Reply of yours is this. That he that is notionally convinced that the denying of Christ is the greatest evil in the world, cannot possibly chuse it so long as he continues that judgment, there being according to his *then* Apprehension no greater

greater evil for the avoiding of which he should think it eligible. If therefore he should *then* chuse it he must chuse it as a greater evil, that is, simply as evil, than which I think there can be no greater absurdity, &c. This Reply is handsome and smart, but in my judgment not free from a fallacious subtilty. If where the greater evil is chosen the two compared evils were of *one kind* that Absurdity would be manifestly consequent, but when one of the Evils is *Moral*, suppose the greatest Moral evil that is, the other *Natural* and very great or the greatest Natural Evil that is, suppose a painful torturous and ignominious Death, in the avoiding of which is implied the securing to himself the natural Ease and sweetness of this present life, tho upon this account he chuse that which is the *greatest Moral evil* and is so esteemed in his notional judgment, yet he cannot be said then to chuse it as *evil*, but as the onely *effectual means*
and

and therefore good or expedient for that end, *viz.* the avoiding the *highest natural Evil* and enjoying the sweet of that great Natural Good, a life painless and at ease. And therefore upon this account he having onely a *Notional judgment* of the *Moral evil* of that highest sin mentioned, but a *lively sense* both of the *natural evil* and Good here specified which are the one avoided the other secured by chusing the aforesaid Moral Evil: It is no wonder that, though retaining still his notional judgment of that greatest Moral Evil he yet chuses it to avoid that horrid natural evil, and to enjoy the sweet of that Natural Good, *viz.* this life with ease and safety, there being in one scale of the balance nothing but the *mere truth of Notion*, in the other the *urgent weight of Life and sense* which will easily preponderate, if there be not *life and sense* also, (which is the state onely of the *Regenerate*) to weigh against it in the other scale of the balance.

lance. So that though the Notional judgment be not corrupted, but that such a sin is still held the greatest *Moral Evil* that is, yet the Soul is born down to follow the suggestion of the *Animal Life and sense* against the dictate of her *notional discernment* and may truly pronounce with *Medea*.

-----*Video meliora proboque
Deteriora sequor.*-----

Nor need I proceed any further. For what is already said I hope will reach every Particular of the whole Paragraph which contains your Reply to this last point. At least it will make good, that the Soul does not chuse evil as evil in the present case, which is the main sting of your Argument.

That we agree in our sentiments touching *Humility* and *Spiritual Mortification*, this profession of yours I easily beleive from reading what occurs in the latter part of your Sermon which is excellently good solid and edifying.

And

And that I have satisfied you in my Determination concerning the pleasure of the *sixt sense* I am glad of that also. And as for this last scruple you move; whether what I have said does not conclude against all those who marry in such an Age when it is impossible according to the course of Nature that this end of propagation should be served, I say it does not so conclude. Because there is a considerable end of marriage besides that of propagation of children, which in our Liturgie the Office of Marriage takes notice of, viz. mutual society Help and Comfort, which comprizeth all the handsome Adjustments of the married Parties, Secular affairs and Oeconomical Conveniences, and also their mutual help to one another in Piety and devout pursuance of fitting themselves for the future State, their Age reminding them that it is not far off. And in this Regard their mutual Society may be very delectable to one another while their

discourses

discourses and Meditations are of the Joyes of the other World, and so they may live chastly and comfortably without any *frustranious abuse* of their bodies upon the titillation of lust, which exact Christian Temperance and holy Meditations and discourses together of their joyous change into the other near approaching state ought to prevent. Sir, I have told you freely my sentiments touching all the things you have propounded, but I dictate nothing but leave all to your own free judgment, and so wishing you good success in your vertuous studies, I take leave and rest

Dear Sir,

Your affectionate Friend

to serve you

Hen. More.

C. C. C. Febr.

22. 168 $\frac{1}{2}$.

The fifth Letter to Dr. More:

Sir,

AS I cannot exprels the *thanks* which I owe you for your great Condescension and Civility, so neither can I the *pleasure* which I had in perusing your ingenious and learned Answer. It is spun throughout with a very fine thred, and richly fraught with curious and retired sense. But yet tho I was and still am exquisitely *pleased*, I am not fully *satisfyed* with it, whether the defect be in *your letter*, or in *my Apprehension* I shall not take upon me to determine. But so it is I cannot as yet bring over my judgment to yours, and that I do not dissent without some *Considerable reason*, it shall be the business of this paper briefly to shew you.

And first then I observe, that the *Postulatum* upon which I ground my Demonstration of the will's necessarily follow-

following the Dictate of the understanding, is by you admitted, as indeed it is by all except only the School of the *Nominals*, namely, *that the Soul cannot will evil as evil*. This you admit by saying (Paragraph the second) *that the Absurdity of chusing evil as evil vanishes*, only you deny the Consequence of that acknowledged absurdity upon such a choice as is made against the Practical Dictate, by saying, *that it vanishes*, Here then is the τὸ ζητούμενον with the truth or falsehood of which I am content the Demonstration should either stand or fall to the ground.

Now to make appear that this is a true Consequence, *that the will by not following the Practical Dictate would chuse evil as evil*, I shall not add any Positive and direct proof to the former Demonstration, but only consider whether the Consequence is any thing invalidated or evaded by what you have offer'd. You say, that although

the Soul does not chuse according *as the Betterness of the Object appears to her understanding*, it does not thence follow that she will chuse *evil as evil*, but that she will chuse a *natural good* and prefer it before the *Moral*. True, but unless this *natural good* be in the present Circumstance, all things consider'd, judg'd *greater and more eligible* than the *Moral*, the chusing of it will not be the chusing of *good*, but of *evil as evil*. For a *less* good (whether *natural* or *any other* it matters not) tho good *singly* consider'd, yet in *Competition* with a greater does *induerere speciem mali*, as a *less* evil tho evil *singly* consider'd yet in *competition* with a greater does *Commence good and eligible*. Such a choice therefore as is here suppos'd would not be the choice of a *natural good*, nay not so much as of *good*, but of *evil as evil*. There is therefore no choice but what is according to the *appearing Betterness of the Object*; which Conclusion you your self seem unawares

unawares to slip into by using the word (*Prefer*) for what is it to *Prefer*, but to think or pronounce upon the whole matter to be *better* or *more eligible*.

And thus you say again concerning St. Peter that he *prefer'd* the *natural* good of security from pain before the *Moral* good of adhesion to his Lord. Well, if so, then however strange it may seem, his understanding *did err* so grossly as at that instant not to think Faithfulness to his Master to be *absolutely* better than security from pain, otherwise his chusing the *latter* would have been the chusing of what he then thought a *lesser good*, and consequently of evil as such. Nor will it *suffice* to say, that there was wanting in that act of his denial the *exertion of his will* toward the *divine good*, That indeed is *true*, but not the *whole Truth*, for had there not been also a defect in his *understanding*, there would have been nothing amiss in his *will*. As for your *εὐαισθησία* or *sensibility of spirit*, I have

a very good liking to the notion, and do think it a *Concomitant* if not the *principal* part of *real Regeneration*. But whereas you say, those that want this *εὐαισθησία* tho *right* in their judgment may yet sin, and that because *Life and sense* can only Counterpoise *life and sense*, to this I reply, that the want of this *εὐαισθησία* may indeed in the heat of a Temptation be the occasion of a *wrong judgment* (and so indeed tis necessary to the prevention of sin that *life and sense* Counterpoise *life and sense*) but it can never be the Occasion of sin *with a right and Practically unerring Judgment*, for the reasons above mention'd. So that notwithstanding this *εὐαισθησία* the *Reason* of the action good or bad will be *ultimately* devolv'd upon the rectitude or obliquity of the *Judgment*. And in that respect only the Axiom will hold true, *Omnis peccans ignorat*.

As to the close of this your third Paragraph how sinning *according to the Dictate*

Dictate of the understanding and yet *against Conscience* are consistent, I think they are very reconcilable. For he that commits a sin tho by not sufficiently attending to it at the moment of action either *as a sin*, or as a *greater evil* he comes to pronounce it eligible and so to chuse it, and so may be said to *sin ignorantly*, yet he sins *knowingly and against conscience too*, in as much as he does such a fact either against an *actual Dictate* that tis a *sin*, or an *habitual Dictate* that tis also a *greater evil*, as I intimated to you in my last.

As to the question which in this next Paragraph you are pleas'd to put to me, whether this *Attention*, wherein I place the seat of *Free Agency*, differ any thing from what is couch'd in that of the Poet

*Quid verum atque bonum quæro & rogo
& omnis in hoc sum.*

I answer that it does, and that my notion may be more clearly conceiv'd, I shall here briefly explain what I mean
by

by this *Power of Attention*. Whereas therefore the Operations and Powers of the Soul as Intelligent are usually divided into these three, *Apprehension*, *Judgment*, and *Discourse*, I find it necessary to add a *fourth*, that of *Attention*, which I look upon as really distinct from the other three, they being Conversant about their Objects as *true* and *false*, but this only as *Intelligible*, and is only in short, a *general power of converting the Acies of the understanding towards any Intelligible Object*, whether simple or complex, and answers exactly to the *Application* of the eye to a *sensible object*, and accordingly is as distinct from either *Apprehension*, *Judgment* or *Discourse* as this *Application of the eye* is from the very *act of Vision*. In short 'tis a kind of *Openness or Wakefulness of Soul*, such as I conceive to be hinted at in Scripture by such and the like expressions as these, *watch lest you enter into Temptation*, *Awake to righteousness and sin not*, *Awake*

wake thou that sleepest and arise from the dead &c. The Notion thus explain'd I will now shew how it differs from that of the *Poet*. The difference is in this. That inquisition of the *Poet* denotes a *particular exertion* and employment of *all* the faculties, a diligent use of all means, methods and opportunities, and that in order to the finding out a *Truth* or a *good not yet known*, but this Attention I speak of is onely a *general wakefulness* of the understanding, or *Application of mind* to the speculation of a *Truth habitually known*, which will make it *actually present*, and so determine the *Practical judgment*, and by that the *Will*.

I come now to the place where you consider my *Answers* to your *Objections*. And here to that distinction of mine of *Speculative* and *Practical knowledge*, the latter of which I said was alwaies follow'd, though not the former, you say they are *both speculative and universal*, the first granted to be so,

so, and the other plainly implied by the choice of the *Eligent*, who in *such* circumstances judges the choice *universally* to be made. I answer, you may call them both *speculative* if you please, I shall not contend with you for a *word*, but then 'tis to be consider'd that there will be *two distinct Speculative Dictates*, one that is *Habitual*, out of the Circumstance of action, that such a thing is *a sin* and *a greater evil*, and another that is *actual*, in the Circumstance of action, that 'tis a *lesser evil*, which therefore for distinction's sake I call *Practical*, because of the *immediate* influence it has upon *action*. Which latter is alwaies follow'd, tho the former is not. Neither is this latter as you say made onely *Practical* by being put into *Practice*, but is so *Antecedaneously*, being that which *determines* the choice of the *Eligent*.

As to the next Paragraph, where you think it incredible that one, who has an *Habitual* knowledg that such a
 thing

thing is a sin, should not remember it to be so *when he is entring upon it*. I reply, that it seems to me most certain, that whoever commits sin must think it some way or other *eligible*. Now this must come to pass one of these two waies, either by his not attending to it as *sin*, or not as a *greater evil*. The *first* of which in *many* cases I can easily conceive *possible*, and the *latter* in *all* cases I think *certain*. And this methinks you your self run into by saying (*Paragraph the sixth*) that the Animal appetite bears the Soul in hand, that such a sin with pleasure and profit is better than an act of virtue with pain and worldly loss. For what is this but in other words to say, that the *Concupiscible* may be so strong and rampant, that the Soul may judge *pro hic & nunc* the *uneasiness* of abstaining to be a *greater evil* than an *unlawful Indulgence*, so as upon that Judgment to chuse the *latter*.

To your next *Paragraph* where you
continue

continue your Charge upon *mere Attention* as a *defective Instrument* towards the discovery of a Moral Object in a Morally corrupt mind, I make this short reply, that since for such a Fact to be a sin, or for sin to be the greatest evil, are plain and obvious Theorems, I cannot conceive but that constant and actual Attention should prove a *sufficient Directory* to the understanding, all the Difficulty is *to be thus actually and constantly attentive*, and here (as I said before) is the work of *grace and Regeneration*.

And now lastly to your last Paragraph concerning the *Instance of Martyrdom*, whereas I said that he, who is notionally convinc'd that the denying of Christ is the greatest evil in the world, cannot possibly chuse it so long as he continues that judgment, there being, according to his then Apprehension, no greater evil for the avoiding of which he should think it eligible, if therefore he should *then* chuse it

it, he must chuse it as the greatest evil, that is simply as evil, &c. This reply you say is not free from a fallacious subtilty, Concerning which you thus distinguish. If where the greater evil is chosen the 2 compared evils were of *one kind*, that absurdity would certainly follow; But where one of the evils is *Moral*, the other *Natural*, tho a man should chuse the greatest Moral evil, yet he cannot be said to chuse it as evil, but as the only means of avoiding the natural evil, and consequently as good. This is the sum of your Answer. To which I return, that I cannot conceive how the diversity of the compared evils, as to their Specifick Nature, can any thing alter the case, the Question as to *eligibility* being not concerning their *specifick natures*, but concerning their *Degrees*, not which is *Natural* and which *Moral*, but which has *most* of the *general nature of evil*. So that if I chuse that which to me has the most of the *general*

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ral nature of evil, notwithstanding its being an evil of *another* kind, I certainly chuse evil as evil. Neither can this be brought off by saying that tis chosen as a means of avoiding the natural evil, and consequently as good, for it can never be good to chuse a greater evil to avoid a less, that being *all over loss and damage*.

And thus as briefly and as fully as I could have I set down the grounds of my opinion, which I am ready to part with upon the first conviction of their weakness or insufficiency. If you should find any thing in this paper worth your notice, you may return answer at your best leisure, for I would by no means divert you from more important concerns. I am very sensible what interruptions I have already given you, but I hope you will easily pardon me when you consider that tis the peculiar reverence I have for your Judgment which has brought this trouble upon you from

(Dear Sir) Your highly obliged Friend and Servant

J. Norris.

AN APPENDIX.

CONsidering with my self that those into whole hands these Papers may light, may not all of them have that other Book of mine, which contains the Hypothesis here defended concerning the *Root of Liberty*, and that tis very necessary the Hypothesis should be seen with its Defence, I thought it convenient to set it down here for the Benefit of the Reader.

The Hypothesis runs thus.

That the will cannot be the immediate Subject of Liberty, must be acknowledged plain, if the will necessarily follows the Practical Dictate of the understanding. And that it does so I think there is Demonstration.

'Tis an unquestionable Axiom in the Schools of Learning, that the Object of the will is *Apparent good*. Now Apparent

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parent good in other words is that which is Judged to be good, and if so, then it Follows that the will cannot but conform to the Dictate of the understanding; Because otherwise something might be the Object of the will that is not apprehended good, which is contrary to the supposition.

In short, the will (as *Aquinas* well expresses it) is the conclusion of an *Operative Syllogism*, and follows as necessarily from the Dictates of the understanding, as any other Conclusion does from its Premises, and Consequently cannot be the immediate Subject of Liberty.

But then are we not involv'd in the same Difficulty as to the *understanding*? Does not that act with equal (if not More) Necessity than the Will? So I know'tis Ordinarily taught.

But if this be absolutely and universally true, I must Confess it above the reach of my Capacity to Salve the Notion of Morality, or Religion. For
since

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since tis evident that the will necessarily conforms to the Dictates of the understanding, if those very Dictates are also wholly and altogether necessary, there can be no such thing as a *Τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν*, the man is bound hand and foot, has nothing left him whereby to render him a Moral Agent, to qualify him for Law or Obligation, Virtue or Vice, Reward or Punishment. But these are consequences not to be indured, and therefore I conclude according to the Rules of right reasoning, the Principle from which they flow to be so too.

To clear up then the whole Business, I shall no longer consider the understanding and will as Faculties really distinct either from the Soul it self, or from one another, but that the Soul does immediately understand and will by it self, without the intervention of any Faculty. And that for this Demonstrative Reason in short, because in the contrary *Hypothesis*, either Judgment

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ment must be ascribed to the will, and then the will immediately commences understanding, or the Assent of the will must be blind, brutish, and unaccountable, both which are Absurd.

This being premised, I grant that as the Soul necessarily wills as she understands, (For so we must now speak) so likewise does she necessarily understand as the Object appears.

And thus far our sight terminates in fatality, and necessity bounds our Horizon. That then which must give us a prospect beyond it must be this, that altho the Soul necessarily understands or judges according to the appearance of things, yet that things should so *appear* (unless it be in Propositions self-evident) is not alike necessary, but depends upon the degrees of *Advertency* or *Attention* which the Soul uses, and which to use either more or less is fully and immediately in her own Power.

And this Indifferency of the Soul as to attending or not attending I take
to

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to be the only τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν the Bottom and Foundation into which the Morality of every action must be at length resolv'd. For a farther proof and illustration of which Hypothesis, let it be apply'd to a particular case, that we may see how well it will answer the *Phenomena*.

In the Case then of *Martyrdom*, I look upon sin as an evil, and not only so but (while I attend fully to its Nature) as the greatest of evils. And as long as I continue this Judgment 'tis utterly impossible I should commit it, there being according to my present apprehension no greater evil for the declining of which I should think it eligible. But now the evil of Pain being presented before me, and I not sufficiently attending to the evil of sin, this latter appears to be the lesser evil of the two, and I accordingly *pro hic & nunc* so pronounce it, and in Conformity to that dictate necessarily chuse it.

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But

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But because twas at first absolutely in my Power to have attended more heedfully, there was liberty in the *Principle*, the mistake which influenc'd the action was *vincible*, and consequently the Action it self justly *imputable*. This is the *Hypothesis*.

I shall now sum up the whole matter in this Order of Reasoning.

1. **T**hat a Creature void of Liberty cannot be capable of Law or Obligation, Vertue or Vice, Reward or Punishment, is certain.

2. That Man is capable of all these, is certain.

3. That Man therefore is indow'd with Liberty, is certain.

4. That Liberty is a *Rational* Perfection, or a Perfection belonging to an *Intellectual* Nature, is certain.

5. That therefore this Liberty must be subjected either in the understanding

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ing or will, or (to speak more properly) in the Soul as Intelligent, or in the Soul as Volent , is certain.

6. That it cannot be subjected in that Part which acts *Necessarily*, is certain.

7. That the will *necessarily* follows the Dictate of the understanding, Or, that the Soul necessarily wills according as she understands, is certain.

8. That therefore this Liberty cannot be immediately subjected in the will, or, in the Soul as Volent, is certain.

9. That therefore it must be subjected in the Soul as Intelligent, is certain.

10. That even the Soul as Intelligent so far as it acts necessarily cannot be the Immediate subject of Liberty, is also certain.

11. That the Soul as Intelligent *necessarily judges* according as the Object appears to her, is certain.

12. That therefore the Soul as *judging* or *forming a judgment*, can no more be the Immediate subject of Liberty, than the Soul as *Volent*, is certain.

13. That,

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13. That, since the Soul necessarily wills as she judges, and necessarily judges as things appear, we have thus far no glimpse of Liberty, is certain.

14. That therefore our Liberty must be founded upon the *No Necessity* of some certain things appearing determinately thus or thus, or that we have no Liberty at all, is as Certain.

15. That things appearing thus or thus (unless in self-evident Propositions) depends upon the various degrees of *Advertency* or *Attention*, and nothing else, is certain.

16. That therefore we have an Immediate Power of Attending or not Attending, or of Attending more or less, is certain.

17. That therefore this Indifferency of the Soul as to Attending or not Attending, or Attending more or less is the Prime Root and Immediate subject of Human liberty, is no less certain, which was the Point to be demonstrated.

ERRATA.

PAG. 37. for Divifition read Divifion. p. 43. for Conveiances
read Conveionce. p. 57. line 14. after, for, add *Our*. p. 58. l.
20. for of read or. p. 71. for pertual read perpetual. p. 90. for
serve r. serves. p. 97. for Common r. Commonly. p. 120. l. 19.
for as r. that. p. 179. l. 2. after, take, add, no. p. 202. for hunc
r. nunc. p. 204. l. 18. before of the, r. violence.

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